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Introduction
American law students are borrowing large sums of money.
For graduates at many schools, cumulative debts of $35,000 from
college and law school have become the norm and debts of $40,000,
$50,000 and even more are common.

The sums students are

borrowing are much larger today than they were ten years ago,
even after adjusting for increases in the cost of living.

They

have risen at a vastly faster pace than the initial salaries at
small law firms and government agencies.

They have even risen

at a faster pace than the initial salaries in many large firms.
The new pattern of borrowing suggests some obvious
questions.

One is whether students' concerns about the burden of

high debts affect the choices they are making about the kinds of
jobs to seek upon graduation.

Another is whether those who are

borrowing these large sums are likely to have difficulty making
payments after they graduate.

As a small step toward answering

these questions, nine law schools agreed to administer a common,
brief questionnaire to the members of their graduating classes in
April 1989.1
the end.)

(The questionnaire is reprinted in an Appendix at

The nine schools, though diverse in many respects, can

not be taken as representative of all American law schools, but
our findings can be seen as suggestive of issues almost certainly
arising in some form at nearly all American law schools. What
1 A tenth school participated, but because of an error of
communication, that school administered the questionnaire only to
those students who had debts rather than to all students in the
graduating class. On discovering this error, we removed that
school's data from the study.
1

follows is a report on the findings from the questionnaire.
Our conclusions are complex.

First, we have found some

slight but significant evidence that at these nine schools, even
after controlling for other significant factors, the higher the
graduates' debts the more likely they are to take jobs in larger
private law firms and the less likely they are to take jobs in
government or legal services.

Thus far, the observable

relationship between debts and job choice is slight.
be a mirage.

It may even

But it may also be a stern warning about the

future.
Our second major set of findings relates to the burden of
debts on recent graduates' standard of living.

our happy

conclusion is that the great majority of the students we surveyed
should be able to pay off their debts without serious discomfort.
The great majority--but not everyone.

A small but worrisome

group report no job at graduation and indicate no setting in
which they think they will find a job.

Among this group, there

are many with substantial debts, some of whom will probably have
grave difficulty making payments.

And, even among those with

jobs at graduation, a small but significant number also seem
likely to report difficulties. The Law School Admission Council
(LSAC) recommends that law graduates avoid loans that will
require them to pay out more than 10 percent of their gross
earnings in loan payments. The LSAC sets a higher level of safe
debt burden than others recommend. Even so, we calculate that
about one in five or one in six of the respondents with jobs at
2

graduation (not even counting those whose jobs are as judicial
clerks) will be exceeding the recommended LSAC maximum and that
this group will include many of those whose earnings are least
likely to rise swiftly after their initial year. The position of
minority students and of students with low grades in law school
is especially worrisome, for, by our calculations, substantially
greater numbers of them are likely to feel strained in making
payments.
This study is based on the graduating class of 1989. During
the 1990-1991 school year, as the nation has moved into a
recession, many private firms are hiring fewer new associates
than they did a few years ago. If the downturn in the market for
lawyers continues, the generally optimistic tone of this report
will become increasingly irrelevant. Many more of our students
will be in trouble.

I.

The Nine Schools
The nine studied schools are all well-established, long-term

members of the Association of American Law Schools.

They differ

nonetheless in several respects that are useful for a study of
debts and the effects of debts.

Several have tuitions that are

among the highest at American law schools.
among the lowest.2

Several others have

The schools also differ widely in the initial

career paths of their graduates--both in the proportions of their
graduating classes who have jobs in hand by the spring of their
2 Three of the nine are public, six are private.
3

last year in law school and, among students with jobs, in the
proportions who take jobs in lower-paying settings such as
government and small firms and in higher-paying settings such as
the large firms.
The tuitions, expenses, and employment patterns do not vary
randomly among the nine schools.

In fact, along these

dimensions, the nine schools divide fairly cleanly into two
groups, which we have called Group A and Group B.

Throughout

this report we will speak primarily in terms of these two groups.
Table I reveals some of their characteristics.

The Group A

schools have lower tuitions, have substantial numbers of students
without jobs in hand at the end of law school, and send many or
most of their graduates to work in government, in small private
law firms, or in settings outside of practice. The Group B
schools have higher tuitions and the great majority of their
students have accepted jobs by graduation, most of them in large
firms. Although it is not revealed by the Table, the students in
the Group B schools generally also face higher housing and other
living costs in the cities in which their schools are located
than did the students at the lower-tuition group A schools.

4

Table I
Characteristics of Nine Schools Studied,
Divided into Two Groups, by Tuition
Four
Lower-Cost
Schools
(Group A)
Range
among
schools
Tuition*

Five
Higher-Cost
Schools
(Group B)
Range
among
schools

Median

$2000-8000

Percent of respondents
with jobs in April
of graduating yr.
39%-86%

$3000

$9000-12,000

63%

70%-96%

Median
$11,000

90%

Percent of respondents
expecting to
work (after any
judicial clerkship)
in:
Government, legal
services, public
interest

12%-31%

23%

9%-17%

12%

Sole practice or
small firms
(1 to 10 lawyers)

19%-33%

31%

1%-18%

4%

Midsized firms
(11 to 50 lawyers)

12%-28%

22%

9%-28%

15%

5%-21%

8%

25%-66%

54%

Large firms
(50+ lawyers)

* For public schools, instate and out-of-state tuitions have been
weighted to reflect the proportion of out-of-state students. All
tuition figures have been rounded to the nearest thousand to
prevent the reader from identifying the school.
Our study is based on the graduates of only nine of the 175
ADA-accredited law schools in the United States.

Many schools

not included in the study could fit comfortably into Group A or
5

Group B, but many, of course, could not.

Some schools that are

not in the study, primarily public schools in highly urbanized
states, are like the schools in Group A in having comparatively
low tuitions but like the schools in Group B in sending most of
their graduates into large firms.
this study.

None of these schools is in

conversely, and problematic for any study of law

students' debts, the study includes none of the many schools-nearly all private, many with no university affiliation--that are
like the Group B schools in having comparatively high tuitions
but like the Group A schools both in having a substantial number
of graduates without jobs at the end of law school and in placing
few of their graduates in the highest-paying settings. Thus, the
study must be seen as a pilot inquiry into two common sorts of
law schools, not as a representative study of American law
schools as a whole.
The survey was conducted in April 1989, within a month or
so of graduation.

survey forms were distributed to the entire

graduating class at each school.

The rate of response ranged

from about 40 percent of the class at one school to over 95
percent at another, with a median of 65 percent. In general, the
Group A schools were smaller than the Group B schools. We thus
obtained information on debts and career plans for 336 students
at Group A schools and 917 students at Group B schools.

6

II. The Educational Debts of American Law Students
Over the past two decades, undergraduate and graduate
education has become increasingly expensive in relation to the
average incomes of American families.

The expenses of attending

law school have risen along with the rest.3

With rising

tuitions, law students have borrowed more to pay for their
education.

In Table II are some examples of tuitions and average

debt burdens for fourteen law schools.

The table was prepared by

the Law School Admission Council in June 1990.

Only a few of

the fourteen schools in the table are among the nine schools in
the study reported here.

3 Se~ J. Kramer, Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, by
Whom and How?, 1987 Duke L.J. 250.
7

Table II
Tuition, Cost of Attendance and Average student Indebtedness
at 14 Public and Private Law Schools
Table Prepared by Law School Admission Council (1990)
(Not the same sample of 9 schools on which this study is based)
Private Institutions

Percent
Increase

1990-91
Cost to
Attend

1989-90
Average
Indebtedness

1980-81
Tuition

1990-91
Tuition

4 schools with 1990
tuitions of $15,000+

- $5700

$15,500

272

$24,477

$40,750

3 schools with 1990
tuitions of $13,000$15,000

$4800

$14,100

294

$24,480

$39,650

Public Institutiorn
4 schools with 1990
instate tuitions of
$3500-5500

$1510

$4700

311

$12,460*

$23,700

3 schools with 1990
instate tuitions
below $2000

$680

$1540

226

$9066*

$19,900

* For instate residents

Indebtednesses at the nine schools in our study show much
the same gap between the higher and lower tuition schools.4

The

respondents at the nine schools we surveyed were asked, "How much
contractually enforceable debt have you accumulated from tuition
and living expenses of college, law school, and any other

4 Our survey was conducted in 1989.
from 1990.
8

The LSAC figures come

graduate studies?" Table III provides the overall figures for the
nine schools.

At both the Group A and Group B schools, the great

majority of graduating students--no fewer than 70 percent at
every school--reported at least some educational debt. Where the
Group A and Group B schools differed was in the size of the debts
of the students with debt.

In general (and hardly surprising),

the debts of the students at the higher-cost Group B schools were
substantially higher than the debts of the students at the lower
cost Group A schools.

As the table reveals, the median debts of

the students at the Group B schools were over twice as high
($33,000) as the median debts of the students at the group B
schools ($15,000).
Table III
Educational Debts from College and Law School,
Four Lower-Tuition and Five Higher-Tuition Schools,
Graduating Classes 1989
Those with debt
% of students
with any
debt
N=

Mean
debt

Median
debt

All respondents at:
Group A (lower
tuition) Schools

336

77%

$21,116

$15,000

Group B (lowertuition) Schools

917

81%

$34,311

$33,000

The means and medians in Table III do not, of course,
adequately convey the diversity of debts among students.
IV displays the diversity.

Table

It shows that fully a third of the
9

respondents at the five higher-cost schools had accumulated debts
of $40,000 or more by the end of law school.
had accumulated debts of at least $50,000.

Indeed, one in six
By contrast, only six

percent of those at the lower cost schools had accumulated a debt
of $40,000 and almost none--a scant one percent--had accumulated
debts of $50,000.
Table IV
Educational Debts, by Ranges,
at Four Lower Tuition (Group A) and
Five Higher Tuition {Group B) Schools,
Graduating Classes 1989
Respondents
at Group A
Schools

Respondents
at Group B
Schools

N=

Percent

N=

Percent

76

23%

175

19%

Proportion with debts of:
$0
$100-$19,900

113

34

144

16

$20,000-$29,900

76

23

130

14

$30,000-$39,900

52

15

156

17

$40,000-$49,900

14

4

147

16

$50,000 or more

5

1

165

18

917

100%

336

10

100%

20%

51%

III.

The Effects of Debts on Students' Job Choices.
Why do students pick the jobs they do? Some reasons pertain

to students' own preferences--for cities of certain sizes, for
practices of certain types, for work settings that are flexible
for families, and so forth. Others pertain to the preferences of
employers--for graduates of certain schools, for graduates with
high grades, for graduates thought likely to "fit in."
To the extent that economic considerations affect student
choices, the dominant consideration is surely not the burden of
educational debt alone but rather the huge variations in the
starting salaries among the work settings that law students
enter. What every second and third year law student in America
knows is that the salaries paid in large law firms are higher
than the salaries paid in judicial clerkships, in government, and
in legal services or public interest settings.

They also know

that large-firm salaries are generally higher than small-firm
salaries. When our survey respondents were second-year students
in 1988, the mean salary nationally for law school graduates of
the class of 1988 who began work in firms of more than 100
lawyers was $58,940; the mean salaries for those entering firms
of 2 to 10 lawyers was $28,480, for those entering government,
$26,910, and for those entering legal services or other public
interest work, $23,860.5 One year later, the salaries reported
by our respondents in the jobs they were actually entering reveal

5 National Assn for Law Placement, Class of 1988 Employment
Report and Salary Survey, at 6, 12 (G. Peschel ed. 1990).
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essentially the same yawning gap.6
The gap between starting salaries in the large firms and
starting salaries in other settings has widened dramatically over
the past 15 or 20 years. 7 (In the early l970's, for example, the
average starting salary for an attorney at the Department of
Justice was approximately the same as the starting salary for an
associate in the largest Washington law firms. Today, the young
attorney starting at the Department of Justice would earn less
than half as much as the large firm associate.)

The widening gap

in salaries probably accounts by itself for much of the decline
over this period that many schools report in the proportions of
their students choosing to enter small firms, government and
legal services.a
6 As reported by our respondents, the mean salary for
those entering firms of more than 100 lawyers was $62,370, while
the mean for those entering firms of 2 to 10 lawyers was $32,830,
for those entering governments, $29,670 and for those entering
legal services or other public interest work, $26,030.
7 See R. Ehrenberg, An Economic Analysis of the Market for Law
School Students, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 627 (1989); Chambers,
Educational Debts and the Worsening Economic Position of SmallFirm. Government, and Legal Services Lawyers, 39 J. of Legal Ed.
709, 721 n. 20 (1989).
·
8 See, e.g., Ehrenberg, preceding footnote. In 1974, 21
percent of law school graduates took first jobs in "public
interest" jobs or government (not including judicial
clerkships). In 1988, 15 percent did so, a decline of about 30
percent. See National Association for Law Placement, Class of
1988 Employment Report and Salary survey at p. 4 (G. Peschel,
ed., 1990). For another purpose, David Chambers, the author of
this report gathered placement information from over fifty law
schools. At over half (and at nearly all those that have been the
principal suppliers to the large firms) , the number of students
taking jobs in government and legal services has declined at a
substantially faster rate than the number of available jobs in
these settings has declined. In my survey, most of the schools
12

One question this study undertook to explore was whether
high educational debts have intensified the effects of, the salary
gap, creating even greater incentives or pressures for students
to seek work in the highest-paying settings.

Most of us who

teach at schools with high tuitions hear complaints from our
students that they cannot afford to take a public sector job
because they need a high income to pay off their loans.

Are

debts really affecting job choices for any significant numbers of
students?

A. The Strategy for Measuring Effects
In planning our survey, we reasoned that if, after taking
other factors into account, there appeared to be DQ correlation
between the size of students' debts and their entry into various
higher- or lower-paying settings, that would constitute rather
strong evidence that debts were exerting little effect on
students' decisions to enter particular settings.
Conversely, we reasoned that if, after taking other factors
into account, a significant correlation persisted between debts
and job choices, with graduates with high debts selecting jobs in
the highest paying settings in greater numbers than graduates
with lower debts (or with no debts), that would constitute
evidence of a relationship of some sort between debts and
that have been the principal suppliers of new lawyers for the
very large firms reported that the proportion of students
entering government or public interest work declined by over 50
percent across the same period.
13

decisions about job settings. Sad to say (for those of us who
want to understand), the exact nature of the relationship would
remain ambiguous.

That is, even if a positive correlation

persisted between size of debts and the selection of high-paying
settings, we could not be certain that debts were causing
students to seek the higher paying settings. It would remain
possible that, for some students, the causal link ran in the
opposite direction:

students who expected to enter a large firm

might have been willing to incur more debt than students who
expected to work in lesser-paying settings.

In that case, high

debts could be seen as an effect rather than a cause of plans to
enter a large firm. It would also be possible that debts and job
choice were related but that neither was the cause of the other:
both the decision to incur large debts and the decision to enter
large firms could be common manifestations of some other
attribute--for example, a desire for living well day by day (both
while a student and thereafter) .9
To permit examining whether any relationship existed between
debts and job choice, we gathered from each respondent
information both about their total debt and about their expected
job setting and earnings in their first year.

(For judicial

clerks, we also learned about the setting in which they expected

9 Yet another relationship might conceivably exist between high
debts and decisions to enter large firms: it is conceivable that
firms prefer students with high debts believing them likely to
work harder (in order to be certain to be able to pay them off).
This explanation has seemed implausible because, so far as we can
find, employers rarely ask about debts during the hiring process.
14

to work after their clerkship.)

The difficult challenge we

faced was in adequately taking into account the many other
factors apart from debt that might affect tastes or opportunities
for work in various settings and that once taken into account
would eliminate any apparent effect of debt.
We were able to gather data on a few of the many factors
other than debts that might have affected the selection of jobs:
Law school grades, for example, almost certainly affect
students' opportunities.

At all but one of our nine schools, we

had self-reported information about the respondents' law school
grades.lO

Similarly, the earnings of a spouse might affect a

student's willingness to take a lower-paying job.

Race and sex

might also affect opportunities--as well as preferences.

We had

information about sex, race, marital or partner status, and
partners' earnings.

We had no other information or clues about

individual characteristics or preferences--no information about
class backgrounds of the students (except that which might be
inferred from level of debt), no information about respondents'
other work experiences or training, and most relevantly, perhaps,
no information about the settings for work that respondents
aspired to enter when they started law school.
Since ours was a study of more than one school, we also
needed to be able to take into account the differences among the

10 At some schools, students reported their grade point
average; at others, their class quartile. At one, the school
provided us information about each student's grades. At one
other, unfortunately, no grade information was obtained.
15

schools that might affect opportunity (or that might reflect
differences in students' career preferences).

Among the many

differences among schools that might affect the opportunities or
reflect the tastes of their graduates, we were able to take only
three into account:
First, as a measure of the differences among schools in
students' employment opportunities, we gathered from the
placement office at each of the nine schools information about
the total number of employers interviewing at the law school
during the 1988-89 school year. Our hypothesis was that the total
number of employers interviewing would be a reasonable proxy for
the numbers of large-firm job opportunities available to the
school's students.11
striking.

The diversity among our nine schools was

One Group A school, for example, had 54 interviewing

employers during 1988-89; another, in Group B, had 850. We coded
for each student the total number of employers interviewing at
his or her school.
Second, the opportunities of a law student are almost
certainly affected by employers' perceptions of the general
level of ability of the students at the student's school.

As a

crude measure of likely employer perceptions about schools, we
coded for each student information about the median LSAT scores

11 We could not obtain more detailed information for each
school on the numbers of government employers or firms with over
50 lawyers that had interviewed during the year. We are almost
certain that there would be a very high correlation between the
total number of interviewing employers and the total number of
large firms interviewing.
16

and median undergraduate gradepoint averages of the entering
classes at his or her schoo1,12 as reported by the law schools in
the LSAS's Official Guide to Law Schools.

The schools in our

sample again varied widely--from one at which the median LSAT was
34 to one at which the median was 43; and from one at which the
median undergraduate gradepoint average of the entering class was
3.0 to another at which it was 3.7.

Such information about

undergraduate grades and scores may well be an unreliable guide
to the actual aptitudes as lawyers of a law school's students,
but impressions based on such grades and scores may nonetheless
affect a law school's reputation, influencing employers'
decisions where to interview or to whom to offer jobs.
Third, and finally, because we were trying to separate the
effects that debts might have on students' job choices from the
effects of the gap between salaries in various settings, we were
interested in the how substantial the salary gap actually
appeared to students at the various schools.

We hypothesized

that government or legal services jobs might look more attractive
at schools where there was the least difference, for that
school's students, between the salaries available in government
jobs and the salaries available in private firms.

As a rough

measure of the appearance of the salary gap at each school, we

12 For each school we created a crude index by adding
together the median LSAT for its entering students and ten times
the median reported undergraduate gradepoint. (Thus a school at
which the entering class had a median LSAT of 38 and a median
undergraduate gradepoint average of 3.3 would have an index of
71--that is, 38 plus (10 x 3.3) = 71.)
17

created an index for each school by dividing the mean starting
salary for our respondents at that school who took jobs in
government, legal services or very small firms by the mean salary
of the respondents at the school who took jobs in larger firms.13
Here, as in each of the other measures, there were substantial
differences among schools, due primarily to the fact that the
mean salaries in private practice, even larger-firm private
firms, were much lower for the graduates of schools sending few
of their graduates into very large firms.1 4 We created a
comparable index based on the ratio of salaries in judicial
clerkships to salaries in private practice.

We then attributed

to each person at each school the index for his or her school.

B.

The Effects of Debts on Decisions about Jobs.
1.

Debts and Decisions to Take a Judicial Clerkship

As an initial inquiry into the effects of debts, we examined
whether people with high debts were shying away from judicial
clerkships, since clerkships tend to pay less well than work in
private practice (and nearly always pay less well than work in
large-firm private practice).

The short answer is no.

At both the Group A schools and the Group B schools, no
13 For this measure, a very small firm was one with 5 or
fewer lawyers, a larger firm was one with 20 or more lawyers.
14 The median expected salaries of students who had accepted jobs
with private firms of 20 or more lawyers varied from $40,700 at
one Group A school to $63,400 at one Group B school. There was
much less difference across schools in the mean expected salaries
of students taking jobs in government, legal services and other
public interest work.
18

significant relationship appeared between size of debt and
whether a person took a clerkship, before or after controls for
other factors.15

Persons with very high debts were as likely to

take clerkships as persons with low debts.

Within the

information available to us, the only factor consistently related
to obtaining a clerkship was law school grades--the higher the
grades, the more likely a clerkship--and even this relationship
was not particularly strong.16

Thus, to the extent that grades

create opportunities for clerkships, students appear to seize the
opportunities without regard to the burden of their debts during
the clerkship year.
Some persons might expect that debts would exercise the
reverse effect on decisions to clerk--that canny, debt-encumbered
students might seek clerkships because they could open doors
thereafter to the highest paying jobs.1 7

Within our data,

15 Nor were those with very high debts at either sort of school
less likely to take clerkships. Similarly, no significant
correlation appears between debt level and decisions to take a
clerkship when those without debts are excluded from the analysis.
1 6 At the Group A schools, the correlation between grade
quartile and taking a job as a clerk was -.19 (remember: the
higher the quartile the lower the gradepoint). At the Group B
schools, the correlation was -.20. At the Group A schools, but
not the group B, women were more likely to take clerkships than
men. At neither the Group A nor Group B schools was taking a
clerkship significantly correlated with debt. (At both the Group
A schools and the Group B schools, the correlation between debt
size and taking a large firm job was -.04.)
17 From conversations with some persons who read this report
in draft, students at many schools appear to believe that working
for state court judges does not improve their chances for
obtaining jobs with firms or other employers. We did not learn
what sort of judge the repondents expected to work for.
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however, after controlling for grades, no evidence exists for
the reverse effect either.

It is nonetheless possible that two

conflicting trends are cancelling each other out--that some highdebt students are avoiding clerkships and other high-debt
students, with a longer view, are deliberately seeking them out.
That is possible, but on the data we have, the more parsimonious
explanation is simply that debts are not exerting much influence
one way or the other on decisions to clerk.

2.

Debts and Decisions to Take Jobs in Other Settings

Unlike judicial clerkships, most other jobs that law
students take after graduation last more than one year.

We thus

expected that, in general, the salaries known to be available in
settings such as large firms or prosecutor's offices would exert
more of an effect on decisions about jobs than the salaries in
judicial clerkships.

We also expected that debts would exert

more of an influence on decisions to seek positions in these
longer-term settings.

Table V reveals, before taking into

account the effects of other variables, the relation between
debts and entry into various job settings for the graduates of
the Group A and Group B schools.
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Table V
Proportions of Responding Students Taking Jobs in
Lower Paying Settings, Midpaying Settings,
and in Firms of More than 20 Lawyers,
by Size of Educational Debts
Students with

no debts
(n=242)

debts of
$1000$14,900
(n=174)

debts of
$15,000$29,900
(n=261)

Proportion
expecting to
take jobs in:

debts of
$30,000$39,900
(n=200)

debts of
$40,000$49,900
(n=154)

debts of
$50,000
or more
(n=165)

Lower Paying
Settings*

24%

39%

31%

25%

18%

17%

Mid-paying
Settings**

24

24

18

14

21

15

~

_ll

_2.1

_§2.

_.§_1

100%

100%

100%

100%

~

Firms of 20+
lawyers

100%

100%

* Lower paying settings include government, legal services, public defenders
public interest work, and firms of 5 or fewer lawyers. The mean earnings of
respondents who had taken jobs in these settings was $29,300.
** Midpaying settings include firms of 6-19 lawyers, corporate counsel's
offices, nonpractice jobs in business, and others not categorized. The mean
earnings of respondents who had taken jobs in these settings was $37,600.
*** The mean earnings of respondents taking jobs in firms of 20 or more
lawyers was $55,200.

Before controlling for any other factors, if those without
debts are included in the analysis, then no consistent, linear
relationship is apparent between debts and jobs settings.

If,

however, those without debts are excluded (on the plausible
theory that the no-debt students may come from higher-status
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families and thus have class-tied reasons for leaning toward
high-status settings) , then there is a consistent relationship
between debt and job setting: the higher the debts, the smaller
the proportion of students taking jobs in government, legal
services or small firms and the larger the proportion of students
taking jobs in mid-sized and large firms. High debts do seem to
accompany decisions to enter the higher-paying settings.
But appearances, of course, are frequently deceiving and a
moment's reflection will reveal a strong reason for suspecting
that Table V is deceptive: one would expect the high-debt
students to include a higher proportion of students entering
larger firm practice not because of high debts themselves but
because high debts reflect high tuitions and, within our sample,
the high-tuition schools are sending very large numbers of their
graduates into large-firm private practice for reasons that may
or may not have anything to do with debts.
Table V does not take into account any of the other factors
that might affect job choices. When we do so, within the data
available to us, the relationship of level of debt to career
choice is more complex but still fairly consistent and still in
the same direction.

We performed a series of regressions,18 in

which our dependent variables--the phenomenon we were trying to
understand--were (1) whether or not the respondent expected a
job in government, legal services, or a small firm (the three
18 Regression analysis is a form of statistical analysis
that permits simultaneously measuring the relation between
several factors and some other phenomenon one wants to explain.
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generally lower-paying settings) and (2) whether or not the
respondent expected a job with a firm of twenty or more lawyers.
(We selected twenty lawyers as the dependent variable because
sufficient numbers of the Group A school graduates took jobs in
such firms to use this as a dependent variable for separate
analyses of the Group A and Group B schools.)l9

For persons who

were going to work next year as judicial clerks, we used their
expected work setting after the clerkship. Because our dependent
variables were dichotomous (1/0),2° we performed the regressions
in both unaltered and logit form. We obtained closely similar
results in each form and report here on the results from the
unaltered form.21
As factors that might explain job choice (the control
variables), we used the students' debt in dollars, whether the

19 Within the group B schools, we also used as a dependent
variable whether or not the student entered a firm of over 50
lawyers. our analyses produced nearly indistinguishable results.
20 We also did some regression analysis using expected first
year income as the dependent variable. Our findings were close
to the same as those reported for our dichotomous variables of
job setting, but since large numbers of the Group A graduates had
no job and thus did not know what their income would be, we could
include many more persons in the analysis by using as our
dependent variable the expected setting of work. Most of those
without jobs seemed realistic about their opportunities. As we
report below, many more of those without jobs expected jobs in
low-paying settings than of those with jobs.
21 The coefficient of the constant term in a logit
regression cannot be directly interpreted as a change in
probability. For this reason, when results by the two approaches
are closely similar, they are more easily interpreted if reported
in unaltered form.
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student had debts above various levels,22 the quartile of the
student by grades within his or her class, whether the student
had a working spouse or partner, and the student's race and sex.
As reported above, we also attributed to all respondents three
items of information about the particular school they attended:
the numbers of employers interviewing at the student's school in
1988-89; an index based on the median LSAT and undergraduate
gradepoint of the school's entering class; and the ratio of the
mean starting salary in government, legal services, or very small
firms of that school's graduates and the mean at that school of
those entering larger firms (the salary-gap ratio). We performed
regressions for all nine schools together, for the Group A
schools and the Group B schools and for each individual school.
Our most pertinent finding is that, even after controls,
educational debt does seem related to job choice, although mildly
and weakly, much more weakly than some other factors.

What we

find is that, in general, when all students in our sample are
examined together or the Group A students and the Group B
students are examined as separate groups, the higher the
student's debts the greater the probability of the student taking
a larger-firm job.23 The results of the regressions are displayed
22 As measures of debt, we used as controls debts in dollars
as well as debts above various levels, such as debts over and
under $30,000 and $40,000 (in the belief that debts may exert
little influence until they reach a certain level).
23 In the regressions we performed, debts in dollars almost
always proved more significantly related to job setting choice
than debts above various levels. Thus, in the analyses reported
here, we have used debts in dollars as the sole measure of debt
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in Appendix Tables Al, A2, and A3.24 In the analyses of the nine
schools as a group, the relationship between size of debt and
entering a large firm is statistically significant (p<.02) both
when all students are considered together and when students
without debts are considered separately. When the Group A and
Group B students are considered separately, the size of debt is
significant only when the analysis is limited to those who have
debts (p<.OS).
Nonetheless, even though significant, the apparent
relationship between debt and job choice is slight.
Specifically, when looking at all respondents with debts, the
data suggests that for each $10,000 increase in a student's debt,
there is a roughly 3 percent decrease in the probability that the
student will take a job in government, legal services or a small
firm and a 3 percent increase in the probability that he or she
will take a job in a larger firm.
When we look separately school by school, our findings
become murkier.

In almost every analysis, the relationship

between debt and job choice is in the expected direction--more
debt, greater likelihood of a larger firm job--but at only three
of the eight schools25 was the relation of debts to job setting
to avoid problems of colinearity.
24 see the third and fourth columns in each Table.
25 At one of our nine schools, we had no information about
grades. Since, as explained below, grades turned out to be such
a critical factor, we did not include this school in the
regressions.
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statistically significant (at the

.os

level).

If, as our analysis suggests, the size of students' debts
is related, but only mildly related, to choice of job setting,
what other factors are more strongly related?

This is a study of

the effects of debt on job choice, not a study of all the factors
affecting job choice in general.

Nonetheless, because further

research is needed to isolate the effects, if any, of debt, some
discussion seems desirable to explain the factors that seem more
important than debts. They are factors that will be especially
important to control for in any future examination of the impact
of debt and one of them, the most important among the other
factors, helps shed more light on the possible impact of debt.
We had, as listed above, only five pieces of information
about our individual respondents other than the information about
educational debt:

sex, race, marital/partner status, earnings of

spouse or partner, and law school grades.

For each of these, a

plausible hypothesis could be advanced for a relationship with
the settings of work that the respondents entered.

Of these

five, however, by far the most significantly related (and
generally, in our analyses, the only one significantly related)
to students' selection of job setting was the student's rank by
quartile within his or her class. See Appendix Tables Al, A2, and
A3.

Thus, our second major finding:

In general. the higher the

student's grades while in law school. the greater the
probability that the student had taken a job or expected to take
a job in a larger law firm and the lower the probability that the
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student expected a job in government, legal services, or a small
firm.
At many of the schools within our sample, particularly among
the

schools in Group A, the relationship between grades and job

setting was powerful, even stunning.

At one Group A school, for

example, 55 percent of the class members who reported themselves
in the top quarter of their class had taken a job or expected to
take a job after any judicial clerkship in a mid-sized or large
firm, while zero percent--not one person-- reporting themselves
in the bottom two quarters expected to work in such a firm.

At

another Group A school, 92 percent of those in the top quarter,
but only 16 percent of those in the bottom two quarters expected
to work in a midsized or large firm.

At some of the Group B,

high-tuition schools there was also a strong relation between
grades and entry into the large firms.26.
The strong correlation between high grades and entering
large firms is hardly a mystery. Every law-school placement
director acknowledges the substantial weight that many employers
accord to grades in the hiring process. Students with high grades
have more choices--and when given the opportunity, they commonly
choose larger firms over smaller firms, government and public

26 At one Group B school, 70 percent of those in the top
quarter but only 8 percent of those in the bottom two quartiles
expected to work in a firm of more than 50 lawyers. Not all Group
B schools exhibited such a relationship. At two of the Group B
schools, the proportion entering large firms was closely similar
across the top three quartiles and fell off only in the fourth
quartile. At another, there was no significant difference across
the quartiles at all.
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interest work. Exactly why persons with the highest grades prefer
the larger firms is less certain. That they do is, of course,
completely consistent with the hypothesis that debts are
important to their choice.

But, of course, that students with

high grades pick the large firms is also consistent with several
other explanations: the higher earnings that are available in the
large

~irms

are attractive in themselves without regard to debt

and large firms may be perceived by students as more prestigious,
and more advantageous for mobility, for training, and for
intellectual challenge.27
The significant place of law school grades in job selection
may shed light on the place of debts in job selection: If high
grades can be seen as signifying choice and control over job
opportunities, then one might expect, within our data, that, to
the extent that debts are playing a role in career choices, they
would display their effects more in the decisions of students
with higher-grades--display themselves more, that is, in the
decisions of the students who are free to pick between larger
firms and other settings than in the decisions of the students
with less control. And there is, in fact, support for this
proposition in our data, which leads to a third finding:
Considering students at all schools together and controlling for
the other factors we have been discussing. high debts are
significantly related to job choice among students in the top
quarter of the class. are still related but less strongly to job
27 See R. Stover, Making It or Breaking It (1988).
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choice among students in the next quarter, but are not
significantly related to job choice among students in the lower
half of the class.28
After taking grades and debt into account, none of the other
individual data we gathered bore a significant relationship to
job setting in our analysis of the Group A schools or Group B
schools as groups.

When we analyzed each school individually,

there were two schools at which women were significantly more
likely than men to take jobs in government, legal services, or
small firms and one school at which African-Americans and
Hispanic students were significantly less likely than white
students to take jobs in a larger firm, but no such pattern for
either women or minorities appeared at any of the other schools.
When we shift from individual information that may affect
opportunity or choice to school information that may affect
opportunity or choice, each of the pieces of information about
the schools as a whole--numbers of interviewing employers,

28 For example, among students in the top quartile of the
class, there was a 4 percent increase in the probability of
taking a job in a large or mid-sized firm for every $10,000
increase in debt, after taking other factors in Appendix Table A
into account (t-ratio for debt: 2.9; p<.Ol). But, there was no
significant relationship between debt and taking a job in a large
or midsized firm among students in the bottom two quarters of the
class. Within both the students with high grades and the students
with lower grades, essentially the same pattern held whether the
analysis was limited to students with at least some debt or
included all students with and without debt. Even with the
students in the top quarter of the class, however, only a small
part of the variance is being explained by debt (considering all
students in the top quarter with and without debt, the marginal
r2 for debt in dollars is .022, after other significant factors
are taken into account) .
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median LSAT and undergraduate GPA for the class, and ratio of
earnings in large firms and other settings--correlates strongly
with the other information about schools as a whole, with whether
students took jobs in larger firms and with whether students took
jobs in government, public interest work and small firms.

In

general, taking jobs in large firms correlates with higher
numbers of interviewers at the school, higher mean LSAT and
gradepoints for the school's entering class, and a greater spread
between the salaries of those at the school taking jobs in
government and the salaries of those taking jobs in larger firms.
Conversely, the reverse relation appeared between these wholeschool variables and taking jobs in government, public interest
or small firms.
In regression analyses in which we analyzed all Group A
schools or all Group B schools or all nine schools together, the
variable among these all school variables that most strongly
correlated with job-setting choice was the number of employers
who had interviewed at the school in the 1988-89 school year.
Thus a fourth finding:

The larger the number of interviewers at

a school, the greater the likelihood of a student taking a job in
a large firm, and the smaller the likelihood of taking a job in
government, legal services, or public interest work.

At the

school where there were 54 interviewers, for example, only 16
percent of the respondents expected to work in a firm with
twenty or more lawyers and only 5 percent expected to work in a
large firm with more than fifty lawyers.
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By contrast, at the

school where there were 850 interviewers, 74 percent of the
students expected to work in a firm of twenty or more lawyers and
61 percent of the students expected work in a firm with more than
fifty lawyers.
Within our data, once the number of interviewers was
controlled for, none of the other whole-school variables explains
much additional variance. One small exception is that, when
considering all schools as a group, the salary-gap ratio--the
measure at each school of the gap between mean earnings in bigger
firms and the mean earnings in government, legal services and
small firms--does serve slightly to predict students' job
selection:

the narrower the salary gap at a student's school,

the higher the probability of the student's taking a job in one
of the lower-earning settings.29
We must nonetheless exercise great caution in identifying
any one or two particular qualities of law schools that are
critically important in affecting job decisions or opportunities.
We have only nine schools in our sample.

For purposes of

identifying school-related variables of significance, we have in
an important sense not a sample of over 1000 but a sample of only
nine.

We would have to have data from many more schools before

we could speak with any confidence about the qualities of schools
that seem to affect the job settings chosen by (or available to)
29 See Appendix Table A1, columns 1 and 2. For neither the
Group A schools nor the Group B schools taken separately does the
salary gap ratio help explain entry into the lower-paying
settings. At the Group A schools, but not the group B, the salary
gap is mildly related to entry into the higher-paying settings.
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their graduates.

And, of course, even if it turned out that the

numbers of interviewing employers was a critical predictor, we
would still need to explain why some schools attract so many
more interviewers than others.

There is, within our small sample

of schools, a strong correlation between numbers of employer
interviewers at each school and the index we developed for each
school based on the entering class's median LSATs and
undergraduate gradepoint average,30 but whether number of
interviewers is simply a surrogate for employers' beliefs about
the quality of the students we cannot tell on the limited
information available to us.

3.

Summary of Findings on the Effects of Debts on Job
Choice

The study of nine schools suggests a relationship between
debts and job choices and suggests that debts may be exerting
some influence on job choices, but that, if they are doing so,
the influence is mild:

as debts increase, only a slight decrease

occurs in the proportion of students expecting to enter
government, legal services, or public interest work, and only a
slight increase occurs in the proportion expecting to enter
larger firms.
Are we seeing the beginnings of a trend, a trend that could
make the effects of debt more and more pronounced over time as
tuitions and other law school expenses continue their rapid rise

30 The correlation is .88.
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and as the gap between large-firm salaries and other salaries
continues to widen? It is possible, in fact, that we have
underestimated the effects of debt even today.31

Or is the small

apparent effect of debts on individual decisions an illusion?
The apparent impact of debt is slight enough that it remains
possible that some other factors we are not yet able to measure
will account for the small relationship between debt and job
choice. To the extent that economic factors shape job choice, it
may be that the effects of the salary gap among settings is so
overwhelming that, even if everyone's educational debts were

3 1 Here is one way that we may be underestimating the
relationship between debt and job choice. It seems likely that if
debt has a relationship to job choice, the relationship will not
be the same for everyone. Some students, but far from all, will
be affected by debt in making choices about jobs or will expect
to take high-paying jobs and are thus more willing to borrow; but
many others with high debts wanted to work in large firms for
reasons that have nothing to do with their debts and do not fix
the amount they are willing to borrow with an eye to the
earnings in the large firms. If this is so (and if, as appears
from the analysis reported above, debt is nonetheless related to
job choice for the sample we have as a whole), then debt must
have a stronger relationship to job choice for the members of the
subgroup who are susceptible to being affected than appears
above. Consider a hypothetical example. Appendix Table A1 reveals
that when all respondents in our study with any debt are analyzed
together, there is a 3 percent increase in the probability that a
student will take a job in a large firm for each $10,000 increase
in that student's debt. If, however, debt and job choice are
linked for only a fourth of the sample, then, for each additional
$10,000 in debt, we would have to have a 12 percent increase
(four times 3 percent) in the probability that a person in the
linked group would take a large firm job in order to average out
to a 3 percent increase overall, at least if we assume that the
effects of other factors (such as grades) are the same for the
susceptible group as for the others. Unfortunately, within our
data, we can neither determine the direction of the relationship
between debt and job choice nor determine the size of the group
for whom there is a relationship.
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completely forgiven at the end of law school, almost everyone
would make the same job choices that they do today.
At the same time, even if individual debts were eventually
proven to bear no relation to job decisions, it does not follow
that the rising costs of legal education are having no effect on
the changing patterns of students' choices.

It is possible that

high tuitions contribute, now more than in the past, to a sense
that a law degree is a capital asset acquired at a very high
cost, an asset that deserves to be exploited for all possible
financial return. such a state of mind, if it exists, might be as
pervasive among those with no debts as it is among those with
high debts. If so, then even if individual debt exerts little
effect on individual choice, the costs of legal education may
still be exercising a powerful, indirect influence on the numbers
of students willing to consider work in lower-paying settings.

IV. Will These Students Have Difficulties Paying Off Their Loans?
The surveyed students reported their accumulated educational
debts, and many of them, noted already, have accumulated a
substantial amount. They also reported their expected job
settings and, if known, their expected first-year earnings.

From

this information, we can make some rough assessment of the
difficulties, if any, that they are likely to experience in the
year after law school in paying their loans.
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A. Measuring the Burden:

How Much Debt Can Law Graduates Manage?

Most educational loans, when assumed, are for ten- to
fifteen-year terms, with interest rates that vary from eight to
as high as twelve percent. Most law students are eligible to
borrow up to $7500 per year of government-guaranteed Stafford
Loans at 8 to 10 percent interest, but additional loans, for
example, the Supplemental Loans for Students (SLS) loans, bear a
higher rate.

The size of payments a borrower will make month by

month over the term of a loan depends, of course, not only on the
rate of interest and the amount borrowed but also on the number
of years over which the loan is to be paid, as well as on whether
the borrower participates in a graduated payment program under
which payments are lower in the first years after graduation.
Table VI provides some illustrations of annual and monthly
payments for loans of varying amounts. All the examples assume
an interest rate of 9 percent, the rate available to students
with government-guaranteed loans who consolidate their payments.
(Only government-guaranteed loans are eligible for consolidation
under current programs.)

What varies is whether the loan is paid

over a 10-year or a 20-year term and whether the borrower elects
an interest-only payment plan for the first two years.
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Table VI
Payments of Interest and Principal
Due in First Year after Law School on Loans
of Varying Amounts, Assuming 9 Percent Interest
and Varying Terms
Loans
totaling
$25,000

Loans
totaling
$40,000

Loans
totaling
$60,000

No principal payments
during first two years*

$2250/yr.
( $188/mo.)

$3600/yr.
($300/mo.)

$5400/yr.
( $450/mo.)

Principal and interest
payable over 20 years*

$2700/yr.
($225/mo.)

$4320/yr.
( $360/mo.)

$6480/yr.
($540/mo.)

Principal and interest
payable over 10 years*

$3800/yr.
($317/mo.)

$6080/yr.
($507/mo.)

$9120/yr.
( $760/mo.)

Annual (and Monthly) Payments
Due under Payment Plan with:

* Terms available through both LAWLOANS Program of HEMAR Ins.
Corp. and the Law Access Program of the Law School Admission
Council.

Can recent graduates afford to make annual payments of $2250
or $4320 or $9120 toward their loans and still "manage"? The
answer, of course, depends on their income, the other demands on
that income and on what we mean by "manage."

At one extreme,

managing can mean being able to pay off a loan while avoiding
bankruptcy.

Most writers about educational debt sensibly reject

such a narrow view.

They appear to ask how much a person can

pay without feeling very pinched.

In many respects, they seem to

be asking a question about psychological burdens not about
serious financial privation.
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At least two different methods have been used to assess the
difficulties that law students (and other students) might have in
making payments.

The first--and the one most commonly used by

those who write about educational debt--is to calculate the debt
payments as a proportion of earned income, dividing the total
payment due each year by either pre-tax or post-tax annual
earnings.

These writers then recommend limiting borrowing so

that no more than a certain proportion of income will be consumed
by loan payments.

The second manner ignores percentages.

It

begins with the student's probable annual earnings, subtracts
from them an estimate of income taxes and Social Security taxes
as well as the annual payments on the loan and then simply looks
to see how much disposable income is left over to live on. How
much disposable income is enough can then be judged by any of
many living-standard formulas that are available.
These different approaches can produce dramatically
different outcomes: A young professional with a high income can
make debt payments that constitute a quite substantial proportion
of his or her income but still have plenty left over for living
expenses.

Because the literature includes both approaches and

because we are interested in both the real and the psychological
impact of debts, we discuss both ways of calculating impact.
We begin with payments as a proportion of income.

Table

VII provides an illustration of a persons with educational debts
of $30,000 and $40,000 and incomes of varying levels and shows
the proportions of their gross incomes that would be taken up in
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paying off their loans under the same three plans we just
examined in Table VI.
Table VII
Illustration of Person with Loans of $30,000 and $40,000
at 9 percent interest:
Proportion of Gross Annual Income That Will Be Paid Out,
Assuming Incomes of Varying Amounts
and Varying Terms
Percent of income paid out
Gross
Gross
Gross
Gross
Income
Income
Income Income
$25,000

$30,000

$40,000 $60,000

No Principal Payments
during first two years

10.8%

9.0%

6.8%

4.5%

Principal and Interest
payable over 20 years

13.0%

10.8%

8.1%

5.4%

Principal and Interest
payable over 10 years

18.2%

15.2%

11.4%

7.6%

No principal payments
during first two years

14.4%

12.0%

9.0%

6.0%

Principal and interest
payable over 20 years

17.3%

14.4%

10.8%

7.2%

Principal and interest
payable over 10 years

24.3%

20.2%

15.2%

10.1%

Assuming loans of $30,000,
loan payments as a
proportion of gross income
under payment plan with:

Assuming loans of $40,000,
loan payments as a
proportion of gross income
under payment plan with:

As illustrated in Table VII, a person with gross income of
$40,000 and a debt of $30,000 would expend between 6.8 percent
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and 11.4 percent of her income toward her loans, depending on the
terms of the loan. Much has been written in recent years about
the size of the educational debts that borrowers can comfortably
handle in relation to their income.32

The percentages of after-

tax income that writers believe that people can manage as
educational loan payments vary widely,33 but nearly all recommend
that borrowers keep themselves to fairly low rates of payment in
relation to their income.
Daniere, one of the respected writers in the field, advised
students not to assume educational debts greater than 7.5 percent
of post-tax first-year income--or roughly 5 to 5.5 percent of
gross or pretax earnings.34

Horch, another frequent and well-

regarded writer, suggests different percentages

~c;r

people at

different earning levels (somewhat higher percentages as income
rises) .

For professionals beginning work at higher beginning

salary levels, he views 9 percent of after-tax earnings (or
roughly 6 to 7 percent of gross earnings) as a manageable

32 See review by Stedman, The Cumulative Educational Debt of
Postsecondary Students: Amounts and Measures of Manageability,
Congressional Research Service (mimeo) (1984); J. Hansen,
Student Loans: Are They overburdening a Generation? (Washington
Office of the College Board) (1987).
33 See Hansen, supra, at 16; see also Horch, Determining Student
Capacity to Borrow, in Proceedings of College Scholarship
Service Colloquium on student Loan Counseling and Debt Management
77, 78 (1985).
34 Id. at 78.
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level.35

John Kramer in a 1987 article says that "no borrower

can afford to repay educational debt in excess of

• 8 percent

of posttax income" (or roughly 5 to 6 percent of gross
earnings) .3 6

Look at Table VII again. For those who have

borrowed $40,000, only persons earning considerably more than
$40,000, probably close to $60,000, would stay within what these
commentators regard as a safe range and even then only if they
were eligible for the federal loan consolidation program that let
them make no principal payments in the first few years, with
substantially higher payments later. Those who have borrowed
$30,000 would have to earn at least $40,000 to stay within the
comfortable range.
The Law School Admission Council, in its literature
explaining the Law Access Program for consolidating debts, takes
a more expansive approach.

It assumes that law graduates can

afford to make payments representing a significantly higher
proportion of their incomes than the other writers recommend.37
The LSAC recommends to law students "monthly loan payments
totaling no more than 10 percent of your gross starting
salary.n38

For law students, ten percent of gross salary will

35 See Horch, Estimating Manageable Educational Loan Limits
for Graduate and Professional Students (Educational Testing
Service 1978).
36 Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, by Whom, and
How?, 1987 Duke L.J. 250, 263-64.
37 LSAC, Law Access: Managing Your Law School Debt (August 1989)·
38 Id. at 2.
40

represent about 14 or 15 percent of post-tax earnings, almost
twice as high a limit as that recommended by Horch or Daniere.39
Under the view of LSAC, the person borrowing $40,000 could feel
comfortable making payments on an income of somewhat less than
$40,000 (around $36,000 in fact), as opposed to the income of
$55,000 to $65,000 that the other writers would commend.
When we turn to the second way of measuring the effects of
debts--not in terms of a proportion of earnings but simply in
terms of what is left over after taxes and debt payments--the
burden of debt seems rather different. In a 1989 article, Kramer
has rethought the position he took in 1987, and argues, cogently,
that, for these young professionals, what ought to concern us
most is not the percentage of income that loan payments represent
but rather the disposable income still available after the
payments.40

Using the same income figures used in Table VII,

Table VIII makes estimates of taxes and calculates disposable
income after taxes and after loan payments for persons borrowing
$40,000 on the most advantageous plan for repayment that defers
principal payments until after the first two years.
39 The Lawloans Program of HEMAR Insurance, which has loaned
more than $400 million to law students, makes no recommendation
of a percentage of income beyond which students should not burden
themselves. In presentations to groups, Kevin Moehn, Vice
President of HEMAR, suggests not assuming loans that will entail
payments that exceed 8 percent of gross income. Conversation with
author, November 29, 1990. His recommendation is thus midway
between the position of writers like Horch and Daniere and that
of Law Access.
40 See Kramer, Who Will Pay the Piper or Leave the Check on
the Table for the Other Guy, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 655, 670-87
(1989).
41

Table VIII
Illustration of Disposable Income after Taxes and after
Loan Payments for Persons with Varying Levels of
Income Who Have Borrowed $40,000

Assumed annual
gross earnings

Estimated
adjusted income
after all taxes*

Disposable income
after taxes and
loan payment on
a $40,000 loan**

$25,000

$19,250

$15,650

$30,000

$22,500

$18,900

$40,000

$28,400

$24,800

$60,000

$41,400

$37,800

* Taking into account federal income taxes for a single person,
Social Security taxes, and an estimate of state and municipal
taxes. See Kramer, Who Will Pay the Piper or Leave the Check on
the Table for the Other Guy, 39 Journal of Legal Education 655,
673-77 (1989).
** Assuming that person chooses payment plan under which all
loans are consolidated at 9 percent with no principal payments
due during first 2 or 4 years. In first year, on a loan of
$40,000, $3600 in interest would be due.

In Table VII, we saw that a person earning $40,000 with a
debt of $40,000 would expend 9 percent of pretax earnings or
nearly 13 percent of after-tax earnings in annual loan payments,
assuming the lowest payment plan available--enough to make
Daniere and Horch nervous and just inside the outer limits
suggested by the LSAC.

As Table VIII reveals, however, the

person earning $40,000 would still have $24,800 left over in
disposable income after making all payments on taxes and loans.
On $24,800, a young lawyer could pay $600 a month in rent, $400 a
month in car payments and auto insurance, $500 a month for food
42

(including restaurant meals) and still have almost $600 per month
left over for other expenses.

Of course, this young lawyer would

prefer to hold onto the $300 per month that she is having to pay
toward her loans, but even with the payments she can lead a life
that most single Americans would envy. Even if she did not opt
for a plan that deferred the principal payments, but simply
consolidated the loan and paid it over a 20-year term at $360 per
month, she would still have about $24,000 in disposable income.
On this analysis, and at these levels of earnings, the more
generous loan limits suggested by the LSAC seem fully justified.
Under even the LSAC's approach, however, the position of
those with debts of $40,000 and smaller gross earnings, earnings
not of $40,000 but rather of $30,000 or $25,000, is less
enviable. For them, $3600 in debt payments after taxes may well
make a significant difference in the quality of life they can
lead. If they have no dependents, they will still be better off
than most Americans, but some may consider themselves no better
off financially than they would have been if they had not gone to
law school at all.

B.

Projected Burdens of Debt
We now report our efforts to calculate the numbers of

graduates within our survey who are likely to feel some
discomfort, by either of the methods of calculation, on the basis
of the actual information they have provided us about their
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future jobs and expected individual and family earnings.4l
For purposes of analysis, we found it helpful to divide the
respondents into three groups.

The first consists of those with

jobs next year in positions other than judicial clerkships.

For

them, our best measure of their probable economic position in
their first years after law school is their expected first-year
earnings, figures we can compare to the probable size of the loan
payments they will be making based on information about their
total debts.

The second group contains those with judicial

clerkships.

For this group, like the first, we can look at

their expected earnings and probable loan payments during their
clerkship, but we give greater attention to their forecast of the
sort of setting in which they expect to work after the
clerkship.

The third group is made up of those who do not yet

have jobs.

For them, we report on the setting in which they

think it is most likely they will find work.

Among our

respondents at the nine schools, 943 had jobs in hand in

41 The survey asked several questions to aid in determining
the respondents' likely financial position in the year
immediately after law school. It first asked the respondents
whether they had arranged a job for next year. If they had, it
asked in what sort of setting and, if a firm, what size firm. It
also asked them their expected first-year income. If they had not
taken a job, it asked in what sort of setting they thought it
most likely that they would be working. If they indicated that
the job they believed they would have next year was a judicial
clerkship, it asked them the sort of setting they expected to
work in after the end of the clerkship. Finally, because it also
bore on their financial position, the questionnaire at seven of
the nine schools asked whether the respondent had a spouse or
life partner with whom they were living and, if they did, what
the probable income of that person would be for next year. See
questionnaire in Appendix.
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positions other than judicial clerks, 156 had taken judicial
clerkships, and 283 had not yet taken a position with any
employer.
1. The Burdens for Those Who Had Accepted Jobs in Positions
Other Than As Judicial Clerks
At the time of our survey, 66 percent of all respondents had
arranged for a job in a position other than a judicial clerkship.
(The 11 percent with jobs as clerks we will discuss in the next
section.)

In general, those with jobs who attended the lower-

cost schools in Group A reported first-year expected earnings
substantially lower than those who attended the higher-cost
schools in Group B.

The mean expected earnings of those who

attended the Group A schools was $36,500.

The mean expected

earnings of those who attended the Group B schools was $54,600.
The Group B graduates will earn much more on average than those
in Group A largely because many more of the Group B graduates
have taken jobs in large law firms,42 and the salaries in the
large firms are, in general, substantially higher than those in
the smaller firms and other settings where the Group A students
more frequently find work.
How much of these expected earnings will be consumed in
paying off educational debts?

We asked respondents their total

accumulated debts, but because we feared that many either would
not know or would not remember what they were going to be, we did
not ask for their expected monthly or annual loan payments.
4 2 See Table I.
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Thus, in order to estimate loan payments in relation to income,
we have made alternative assumptions based on the three sorts of
payment plans that we have used in our illustrating tables. (See
Tables VI and VII.)

We then used the two methods of measuring

debt burden already discussed--debt payments as a proportion of
gross earnings and net disposable income after taxes and debt
payments.
Table IX uses the first approach to measuring the burdens of
debt.

For both the Group A and Group B graduates, it shows our

calculations of probable debt payments in relation to earnings
based on the actual debts and actual expected earnings of the
respondents with debts.

The table displays the median loan

payment as a percent of reported individual income as well as the
proportions of the graduates who will probably be paying more
than 8, more than 10 or more than 12 percent of their gross
income toward their loans.

The 10 percent figure is the LSAC's

suggested outside limit on the proportion of income a recent law
graduate should consume in loan payments, and all three of the
figures--a, 10, or 12 percent of gross income--are substantially
higher than the levels recommended by other writers such as Horch
and Daniere.43

43

See text, supra, at notes 34 and 35.
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Table IX
Respondents with Any Debt
and with a Job Next Year Other Than As a Judicial Clerk:
Loan Payments as a Percent of Expected Pre-Tax Earnings,
Nine Schools, Graduating Classes 1989

N=

If all students
paid their loans
at 9 percent over
a 10-year term:

Median
loan pyt
as a % of
pretax
income*
in 1st yr

% paying
more than
8% of
pre-tax
income
as loan
payment

% paying
more than
10% of
pre-tax
income
as loan
payment

% paying
more than
12% of
pre-tax
income
as loan
payment

.

Group A schools

120

9.3%

57%

45%

35%

Group B schools

535

9.5%

59%

46%

33%

Group A schools

120

6.7%

39%

13%

Group B schools

535

6.6%

35%

9%

If all students
chose 9 percent,
20-year
payment plan:

If all students
chose 20 or 25-Year
plan, with no
principal payments
during first 2 years:
Group A schools

120

5.6%

29%

6%

Group B schools

535

5.6%

26%

6%

* Pretax income based on actual income reported as expected income
by the respondents

The first notable aspect of the figures in Table IX is that,
despite the fact that the graduates of the higher-cost schools
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tend to have accumulate larger debts than the graduates of the
lower-cost schools, the graduates of the two sets of schools, as
a group, will probably end up paying remarkably similar
proportions of their gross incomes in debt payments.

Whichever

payment plan we assume, the median loan payments represent
virtually identical proportions of income of the graduates of the
two groups of schools.
The second notable point is that, in general, loan payments
will constitute a substantial pr?portion of the gross earnings of
most of the respondents with debts. If none of the respondents
consolidated their loans and all elected to pay them off at 9
percent over a straight ten-year term, nearly half the students
would be paying in their first year more than 10 percent of their
gross income toward their loans (see upper part of table). Of
course, many students will choose to consolidate, especially
those with the largest debts. But, as the Table reveals, even if
all were eligible for and chose to consolidate under the most
favorable payment plan (the plan under which no principal
payments are required in the opening years), the median level of
payments would still be 5.6 percent of gross earnings or roughly
7 to 8 percent of net earnings after taxes.

Seven to eight

percent of net earnings is roughly the level that Horch and
Daniere suggest as the outer limit of comfort in paying debts.
We cannot know how many people will in fact choose to
consolidate. Some borrowers are not eligible for the federally
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supported consolidation programs,44 and others will be quite
reluctant to tie themselves to escalating payments into the
distant future (even though they can prepay and even though they
would be paying with inflated dollars) . Since our goal is to
understand who will feel financially strapped in the years
immediately after law school, the greatest concern should be for
those who will feel strapped even though they take advantage of
ways to reduce the initial year's payments. As such, looking at
the burdens that would be faced if all the respondents picked one
of the two lower-payment plans illustrated in the Tables (the
bottom two sets of figures in Table IX) seems a reasonable
measure of the burden.
Look again at that part of Table IX. If we use the measure
of burden suggested by the LSAC--that recent law graduates should
not pay out each year more than 10 percent of their gross income
toward their debt--then between 12 and 20 percent of the Group A
students with any debts and between 14 and 24 percent of the
Group B students with any debts (the underlined numbers in the
table) will be paying out during their first year at a higher
level than the LSAC recommends. That is roughly one in five or
one in six of all the students with debts who had jobs in hand
at graduation (not counting the judicial clerks) .
What sorts of debts and debt burdens are being carried by

44 As stated earlier, only federally guaranteed loans can be
consolidated under the advantageous terms. Loans from private
lenders or loans from a law school's own loan funds are not
eligible for the federal consolidation programs.
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these students with high payments in relation to their incomes?
Quite high. Consider the students, 89 in all, who will pay out 10
percent or more of their gross income, even if they select the
plan that defers principal payments.

At the lower-cost Group A

schools, this group reports that they expect to earn, on
average, $25,300 in their first year, while carrying debts
averaging $35,800.

They will thus be making annual payments

averaging $3222 or 12.7 percent of their pretax income.

The

comparable group of students from the Group B schools earn more-an average of $37,700--but pay out much the same proportion•of
their income.

They report debts averaging $55,000 and will make

annual payments averaging $4950, payments which represent an
average of 13.1 percent of their gross income.

By any of the

recommended standards, this is a substantial burden.
How students get into this position of heavy debt in
relation to earnings is a question that is impossible to answer
with any certainty on the data we have.

A part of the answer is

probably very simple: many students borrow what it takes to get
them through school; they then seek the highest paying jobs they
can find (consistent with other goals) and, even so, simply end
up with very high payments in relation to the earnings available
to them.
We find an intriguing correlation between law school grades
and debt burdens that may shed some added light on this simple
explanation. At both the Group A schools and the Group B
schools, those students who, by our computations, will be paying
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10 percent or more of their income toward their loans had, on
average, substantially lower grades than the students with lesser
burdens in relation to their incomes.

At the Group B schools,

for example, of those with debt who will be paying less than 8
percent of gross income toward their debts (a safe group, in the
view of the LSAC), 37 percent reported themselves in the top
quarter of their class and only 34 percent in the bottom two
quarters.45 By contrast, of the pressed group who will be making
payments equalling more than 10 percent of their gross income,
only 3 percent were in the top quarter of their class and 71
percent were in the bottom two quarters.46 One possible
explanation for this strong relationship between grades and
probable debt burden is that those with lower grades at the end
of law school start borrowing in their first year at the same
levels as everyone else, keep on borrowing at that level even
after they do less well academically than their classmates, and,
by the end of law school have borrowed as much as (or more
than)47 the rest of their classmates but simply do not as
45 Here again, we are looking at the group who would be paying
out 10 percent of their income even if they chose the plan that
permits them to defer payments of principal.
46 The story was much the same at the group A schools. There, of
those with debts who will probably be paying less than 8 percent
of gross income toward· their debts, 45 percent were in the top
quarter of their class and only 26 percent were in the bottom two
quarters, whereas, of those who will likely be paying 10 percent
or more, only 17 percent were in the top quarter and 61 percent
were in the bottom two quarters.
47 One puzzlement is that, at the Group B schools, there is a
strong correlation between total educational debt and law .
school performance--the lower the students' grades the more he or
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frequently receive offers to work in the highest paying
settings.48
By our first measure of debt burden--payments due as a
proportion of expected gross income--we have now seen that about
a fifth or sixth of the students with debt at the Group A and
Group B schools will be paying out 10 percent or more of their
first-year earnings in debt payments.

When we shift to our

second measure of burden and look simply at how many dollars of
disposable income our respondents are likely to have left after
paying their taxes and their loans installments, our findings
are, as expected, somewhat different.

As Table X reveals, by

this method if we again assume that all students take the most
favorable consolidation plan that permits them to defer principal
payments, somewhat more of the Group A students--but many fewer
of the Group B students--seem likely to experience financial
difficulties.

(The results are only slightly different if

students choose the 20-year consolidated payment plan in which

she is likely to have borrowed by the end of law school. The
pattern holds for both white and minority students. One possible
(but untested) explanation for this pattern is that the students
with the higher grades obtain the higher-paying summer jobs or
part-time jobs during law school and find they need to borrow
less. Another explanation is that at some schools, students with
higher grades receive more scholarship money and thus need not
borrow as much.
48 Another possible explanation for this relationship between
grades and debt burden is that those with high debts are more
likely than those with lower debts to have paid employment during
law school which interferes with academic achievement.
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they make both interest and principal payments.)49
Table X
Disposable Income after Taxes and
Debt Payments on Lowest Payment Plan,
Based on Income Reported by Respondents with Debts
and with Jobs Other Than as Judicial Clerks,
Nine Schools, 1989

N=
Group

Median
gross
income

Median
income
after
taxes*

Median
disposable
income after
taxes and
debt pyts**

9.:- with
"
disposable
income
less than
$20,000

Schools

102

$34,000

$24,480

$22,550

35%

Group B Schools

521

$57,000

$38,190

$34,833

8%

A

* Taking into account federal income taxes for a single person,
Social Security taxes, and an estimate of state and municipal taxes.
See Kramer, Who Will Pay the Piper or Leave the Check on the Table
for the Other Guy, 39 J. of Legal Education 655, 673-77 (1989).
** Debt payments based on multiplying each students' reported total
debt by .09, the interest rate on consolidated loans. Under the
Lawloans Program students can defer principal payments for two or
four years, if their loans qualify for deferral.
Table IX reveals that, even after paying their taxes and
loan installments, the median borrower at the more expensive
Group B schools still has almost $35,000 in disposable income.
That median borrower is, as we have seen before, paying roughly 6
percent of her gross earnings toward her debts, but she still has

49 If all students chose to consolidate their loans at a
flat rate across the 20 years (instead of deferring principal
payments) , the students at the Group A schools would have median
incomes of $22,350 (rather than the $22,550 we estimate in Table
XI) and the students at the Group B schools would have median
incomes of $34,167 (rather than the $34,833 we estimate in the
Table.) Only slightly more of the students at each group of
schools would have disposable incomes of less than $20,000.
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lots of income left over.

Only 8 percent of the Group B students

with jobs in settings other than judicial clerkships end up
with disposable income of less than $20,000. Even the group that
we were worrying about a few pages back--the graduates paying 10
percent or more of their gross income toward their loans--will,
if they are graduates of one of the Group B schools, typically
end up with more than $20,000 in disposable income.50
Table X also reveals that, even the more modest earning
graduates of the Group A schools will have, as a median, $22,550
of disposable income after taxes and debt payments.

Among Group

A's graduates, but not Group B's, there is nonetheless a
substantial group of persons--35 percent of the students with
debt--who, after taxes and debt payments, will .have disposable
income of less than $20,000.

(In fact, 14 percent in fact will

have disposable incomes of less than $15,000.)

Their modest net

incomes in comparison to most of their classmates is not, of
course, due primarily to their loan payments.

These are persons

with comparatively low base salaries, most of them about to begin
jobs in small firms or government.

A few of those whom we

expect to have disposable incomes of less than $20,000 expect to
have gross income before taxes of less than $20,000 and several
more will have net income after taxes but before their debt

50 At the Group B schools, as reported above, the group who
will be paying 10 percent or more of their gross income toward
their loans had, on average, gross income of $37,700 and aftertax income of around $28,300, so that with debt payments
averaging $4950, they would have, on average, disposable incomes
of $23,350.
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payments of less than $20,ooo.51

Still, even if the debt

payments are not the largest factor in their lower income, the
payments, whatever they are, will have a larger effect on their
actual standard of living than the payments of most of those with
much higher incomes •

.

2. The Burdens for Those with Jobs as Judicial Clerks
Judicial clerkships are a modest paying job among starting
jobs for lawyers.

Within our sample, the great majority of the

graduates with clerkships--about 75 percent--expected to earn
between $25,000 and $30,000 during their clerkship year.

Not

surprisingly, many will be making large debt payments in
relation to their earnings.

For the purposes of this study,

however, it makes little sense to devote much attention to the
economic position of clerks because clerkships typically last
only one year and the comparatively low earnings during that year
are little or no guide to the probable earnings of the clerk in
the years that follow.

On average, students with clerkships at

nearly all the schools we surveyed had higher grades than the
students entering any other type of work.52

Many of the clerks

expect to go into highly paid work in large private firms.
For this reason, we asked persons with clerkships both their
51 Fourteen persons (or roughly 2 percent) of the 633
borrowers for whom we had earnings and debt information had net
earnings after taxes of more than $20,000 but disposable income
of ~ess than $20,000 after making their loan payments.
52 At the eight schools for which we had information about
academic performance, over half of those who had taken jobs as
clerks reported themselves in the highest quartile in their class.
55

expected earnings during their clerkships and their most
probable setting for work after they completed their clerkship.
Among our respondents, 177 persons, 14 percent of all
respondents, expect to be working in a judicial clerkship,
roughly the same proportion at the group A and group B schools.53
As Table XI reveals, many clerks will be paying a substantial
part of their earnings toward their debts during their clerkship
year, even if they all consolidated their loans and elected the
lowest payment plan. In fact, even on this assumption, about a
quarter of the clerks from the Group A schools and over half the
clerks from the Group

B

schools will be expending 10 percent or

more of their gross earnings toward their loan payments.

More

Group B than Group A school clerks will pay out a high percentage
of their earnings because the clerkship jobs available to the
Group A graduates pay as much, on average, as the clerkships
available to the Group

B

graduates, but as we have already seen,

the graduates of the Group B schools have, in general, borrowed
much more and face higher loan payments.
In some regards, Table XI overstates the annualized burden
on the clerks, since, under many programs, no loan payments are
due until six months after graduation.

What the Table displays

is the proportion of monthly earnings that will be consumed once
payments start coming due.
53 156 had accepted jobs as clerk at the time of our
survey; an additional 21 (half of them at one school) did not
have a clerkship yet but expected to receive one. Many of these
were at one Group A school where state judges apparently wait
until late Spring of the third year before picking their clerks.
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Table XI
Information about Debt Burdens of Judicial Clerks
During Their Clerkship Year,
Nine Schools, Graduating Classes 1989
Group A
Schools
Number expecting to work
as judicial clerks

52 of 345 (15%)

Mean earnings
Percentage of clerks with some debt

Group B
Schools
125 of 954 (13%)

$29,100

$28,900

80%

73%

6.5%

11.0%

28%
24%
16%

66%
58%
43%

Among clerks with debts:
Assuming lowest payment plan,*
debt payment during clerking
year as a percent of gross
monthly earnings (median)
Assuming lowest payment plan,
percent who will
expend toward loan payments:
more than 8% of gross earnings
more than 10 of gross earnings
more than 12% of gross earnings

* Payment plan under which students consolidate loans and pay
interest at 9 percent but no principal payments during
first two or four years.
As reported earlier, at neither the Group A nor Group B
schools did students seem to be avoiding clerkships because of
the prospect of heavy debt payments.5 4

The table above bears

further witness to the attraction of clerkships: that roughly 58
percent of the Group B school clerks will be paying more than 10
percent of their gross earnings toward their loan payments during
54 See Section IIIB1 pebts and Decisions to Take a Judicial
Clerkship.
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their clerkship year strongly suggests, in itself, that, for many
students, the prospect of heavy debt payments during that year
serves as little, if any, deterrent to working for a judge.
What will the clerks do after they complete their clerkship?
Is it safe to assume that they will then be in a position to pay
off their loans with comfort?

About a sixth of the clerks did

not respond to the question asking for their most probable work
setting after their clerkship or said that they didn't know where
they would be working.

Some who did indicate a probable work

setting indicated more than one.55

Of those who forecast where

they would work, two-thirds planned to work in private practice,
but a surprisingly high number indicated a plan to work in one
of the three settings that typically offer lesser earnings than
others.

Of the clerks who graduated from the Group A schools, 40

percent said that they planned to work

~n

government, legal

services (or other public interest setting}, or a small firm.

Of

the clerks who graduated from the Group B schools, 35 percent
said that they planned to work in one of these settings.
Since we cannot know the earnings that clerks will have in
the jobs they take after their clerkships, the most we can do
toward identifying those who may feel strained in paying their
loans is to look at the debts of the fifty-two clerks who say
they plan to enter one of the three generally lower-paying
55 About 15 percent of those with plans indicated two
possible post-clerkship settings. Seven people indicated they
planned to work in a firm or in government or in a firm or legal
services. We counted these people as planning to work in
government or legal services respectively.
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settings.

The fifty-two included many people with substantial

educational debts.

As Table XII displays, thirty-five percent

of those expecting to work in lower-paying settings have debts of
$30,000 or more.

Nearly all were at Group B schools.

The median

debts of those who had debts of $30,000 or more was $43,000.

If

a former clerk earned, say, $33,000 in a government agency or
small firm in the first year after the clerkship and had a debt
of $43,000, she would expend about 13 percent of her pretax
income in loan payments, even if she elected the lowest payment
plan during the initial years after law school.

That is well

above the LSAC maximum recommended level of 10 percent.

A person

with a lower debt of $30,000 but the same earnings of $33,000
would be paying about 10 percent of pretax earnings, right at the
LSAC recommended maximum.

Table XII
Educational Debts of Clerks Who Plan to Work in Government,
Legal Services or Small Firms After the Clerkship,
Nine Schools, Graduating Classes 1989
Proportion with educational debts of
$30,000
or more

$40,000
or more

$50,000
or more

Total
n=

n=

percent
of total

n=

percent
of total

n=

percent
of total

52

18

35%

10

19%

4

8%

Median debts of those with debts of over $30,000--$43,000
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3. The Burdens for Those Who Did Not Have Jobs at the Time
of the survey
At the time of the survey in April of their last year of law
school, 21 percent of the respondents--283 persons in
all--responded "no" to the question "Do you have a job arranged
for next year?"

Forty percent of the graduates of the Group A

schools and 15 percent of the graduates of the Group B schools
reported that they did not have jobs.
The most worrisome group among those who said that they did
not have a job were those who had no answer to a follow-up
question that asked those without jobs what sort of job they
thought it was most likely they would eventually take.

Fifteen

percent of those without jobs left blank the answer to this
question or answered that they did not know.

As a group, those

without jobs who indicated no probable job setting had lower law
school grades than those without jobs who indicated where they
expected to work (and much lower grades than those with jobs in
hand) .56

A disproportionate number of those without jobs and

without stated expectations were minority group members.57

It

5 6 Among those with jobs, only 11 percent placed themselves in
the bottom quartile of their class. Among those without jobs but
who reported a particular setting in which they thought it likely
that they would be working, 26 percent reported themselves in the
bottom quarter. But, among those without a job and without any
stated plan for a job, 46 percent reported themselves in the
bottom quarter (and another 27 percent reported themselves in the
third quarter) .
57 Thirty percent of the persons without jobs and without
expectations were nonwhite, in comparison to 16 percent of the
respondents in the survey as a whole.
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may well be that this group without jobs or plans will include a
substantial number who will have difficulty finding a job as a
lawyer at all.

(The National Association for Law Placement

reports that, of the class of 1988 at American law schools, 7
percent were unemployed six months after graduation and another
2 percent were working parttime only.)58
Among those without jobs, concerns do not stop with those
who indicated no expected setting for work.

As a group, those

without jobs who did report an expected setting had very
different expectations for the jobs they would eventually obtain
than did those who had already arranged a position, different
expectations of direct relevance to this inquiry.

Among those

with jobs in hand,59 39 percent of those attending the lower cost
Group A schools and 12 percent of those attending the higher cost
Group B schools indicated that they had taken jobs in a small
firm, government or legal services, the three lower paying
settings. By contrast, of those who had not yet taken a job, 67
percent of those attending the Group A schools and 33 percent of
those attending the Group B schools, indicated that they
expected to find a job in one of the three lower-paying settings.
Why did so many more of those without a job by April of
their third year expect a job in one of the lower paying
settings? Briefly, there are probably two principal reasons.
58 NALP, Class of 1988 Employment Report and Salary Survey, at
1 (G. Peschel ed. 1990).
59 Excluding those with jobs as clerks.
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First, government agencies, legal services offices and very
small firms are frequently either unable to make commitments on
new positions many months in advance or unwilling to make
commitments until the recent graduate has passed the bar.

And,

second, within schools, those without jobs tended to be persons
with lower academic records60 and, as we have seen above, those
with higher grades tended to have taken the jobs as judicial
clerks; they were also more likely to have obtained jobs as
associates in the larger firms.
Whatever the reason, a large number of persons without
jobs--130 in all--expected to take jobs in one of the three lower
paying settings and, as we have seen, an additional 43 persons
without jobs did not report any expected setting for work.
Since few of these 173 persons without jobs guessed what
they would be earning in the year after their graduation, we have
the same problem in calculating how much of their earnings are
likely to be tied up in loan payments that we do for the judicial
clerks in their jobs after their clerkships.

As with the clerks,

the best we can do, as revealed in Table XIII, is to identify
those who indicate a likelihood of being in a lower-earning
setting or who gave no indication of any job setting and see how
many of them reported high debts.

60 Of those without jobs, 6 percent were in the top
quartile of their class and 30 percent were in the bottom
quartile. Of those with jobs, 36 percent were in the top
quartile and 11 percent were in the bottom quartile.
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Table XIII
Educational Debts of Persons Without Jobs
Who Indicated That They Were Likely
to Be Working in Government, Legal Services or
Small Firms or Who Indicated No Job Plans at Al~
Nine Schools, Graduating Classes 1989
Proportion with Educational Debts of:
$30,000
o;r mo;re

$40,000
or more

$50,000
or more

Total
n=

n=

percent
of total

n=

percent
of total

n=

percent
of total

154*

50

31%

23

15%

13

8%

Median debts of those with debts of over $30,000--$38,000
* There were 173 persons without jobs who indicated an
expectation to work in government, legal services or a small firm
or who gave no indication of any plans, but only 154 of this
group answered the question about debts.
As Table XIII reveals, 31 percent of those without jobs who
do not have plans or whose expectations were for work in a small
firm, government, or legal services will be carrying debts of
$30,000 or more.

If it takes many months for some of this group

to find employment, some will find that loan payments are coming
due before they have earned incomes with which to make the
payments.61

61 The burdens may be less severe for those within this
group who have working partners, but only 22 percent of the group
do have a working partner, a smaller percentage than is the case
for the more fortunate group who already had jobs in hand.
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4.

Summary of the Debt Burdens

Three groups of graduating students have been identified who
may well feel pinched in paying off their debts: (1) those with
jobs next year in positions other than as judicial clerks whose
debt payments, assuming a consolidated 20-year payment plan, are
likely to exceed 10 percent of their estimated gross incomes;62
(2) those working next year as judicial clerks who have debts of
$30,000 or more and who plan to work, after their clerkship, in a
small firm, in government or in legal services;63 and (3} those
who had no job at the end of their third year, had debts of
$30,000 or more and who either reported no expected setting of
62 See section IV B1, supra. In that section (see
particularly Table IX) , we gave illustrations based on
alternative assumptions about the payment plans students might
elect. The two consolidated payments plans assure lower monthly
payments for students. Under the most advantageous of these plans
(as measured solely by keeping the payments due as low as
possible during the initial year), students would pay interest
only--that is .09 times their debt--during their initial year
(see last illustration in Table X). Under the other consolidated
plan, students would make both interest and principal payments
but would spread their payments out over 20 years. Under this
plan, annual payments equal 10.8 percent of the total debt. (See
middle illustration in Table X.) Because the consolidation plans
are available only for federally-guaranteed loans and because,
even for those who can consolidate, the 9 percent rate is
available only to those whose loans were predominately at the
lowest interest rates among the federal loans, it seems
inappropriate to assume that everyone will be paying (or could
choose to be paying) at the lowest rate. For purposes of this
section, we have made a middle assumption. We have assumed that
everyone is making payments each year not equal to 9 percent or
10.8 percent of their total loan amount, but rather equal to 10
percent of their total loan amount. That rate of payment is
higher than the 9 percent maximally advantageous rate, but still
vastly lower than the 15.2 percent of the total loan amount that
is paid annually by those who do not consolidate and pay over a
10-year period. (See first illustration in Table X.)
63 See Section IV B2, supra.
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work or reported expecting to work in a small firm, in government
or in legal services.64
The good news from our study is that of the 1172 persons
for whom we have adequate information about debts, 84 percent fit
into none of these three groups.

See Table XIV.

Roughly 20

percent of our respondents had no educational debt at all, and of
the others who did and who fit into none of the three risk
groups, the median person (among those who did have a job and
knew their earnings) will be paying between 5 and 7 percent of
her gross earnings in debt payments, assuming she adopts one of
the debt consolidation plans.65

That is comfortably within the

range suggested by the Law School Admission Council.

For the

great majority of these borrowers, their loan payments will be a
monthly annoyance, but not a significant burden.

For many of

this group, perhaps most, loans will have made law school
possible, and the jobs available to them after law school will
make the payments easily affordable. For them, law school will
have been a very good deal.66

64 See Section IV B3, supra.
65 Compare Table IX. It includes all students with debt.
66 See R. Ehrenberg, An Economic Analysis of the Market for
Law School Students, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 627 (1989).
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Table XIV
Debt Burdens in First Year After Law School
Faced by Respondents at Nine Schools,
Graduating Classes, 1989
N=

Students with no debts

230

Students with debts who should
not experience substantial
burden in paying off their
loans

%

20%
84%

750

64

124

10

Three groups likely to
be burdened by debt:
Persons with job next year
who will expend over io
percent of gross income
in loan payments*
Judicial clerks with high
debts planning to work
after clerkship in lower
pay setting**

18

2

Persons without job for next
year who have high debts
and expect to work in lower
pay setting***

50

4

1172

100%

16%

* Excluding judicial clerks. Assumes loan payments made on a
consolidated plan at 9 percent interest. See explanation in n.62.
** High debt defined as a debt of at least $30,000; lower pay
settings include government, legal services, public defenders,
public interest firms, and firms of fewer than 10 lawyers.
*** For definitions of high debt and lower pay settings, see
preceding note. Also included here were persons without jobs
next year and without any reported expected setting for a job.

As in every tale of plenty, however, a few will do less well
than others.

By our rough calculations, 172 persons will be in
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one of the three groups we identify as likely to feel somewhat
burdened.

Those 172 persons represent about 16 percent of all

respondents to the survey--14 percent of the respondents at the
Group A schools and 17 percent of the respondents at the Group B
schools.67

Many of those in the burdened group do not yet have

a job for next year.

Of those who do have jobs, those in the

burdened group with jobs other than as clerks will be paying, on
average, 13.9 percent of their gross income toward their loans
or nearly 20 percent of their net income after taxes.
Our calculations of the group likely to feel burdened are
necessarily very rough.
~nd

In some senses, they are conservative

underestimate the numbers likely to feel burdened.

No

graduates with a job next year are included unless, if they
chose to repay their loans on a 20-year consolidated basis, they
would make payments that represented 10 percent or more of their
gross income. Yet many of our respondents who expect to earn
$25,000 or $30,000 and who will pay 8 or 9 percent of their gross
earnings will also feel squeezed.

Similarly excluded are

persons who did not have a job at graduation but who reported
expecting a job in a midsized or large firm.

If the members of

this group obtain the jobs they are expecting, most will probably
experience no burden at all.

But some of this group have very

high debts and will probably feel pinched even if they obtain a
job in a high-paying setting.

And others will not secure the

67 The 172 potentially burdened students also represent about
percent of all the respondents with any educational debt.
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jobs they expect and will end up, contrary to their hopes, in
lesser-paying settings.
In other important senses, however, we have probably
overestimated the size of the burdened group.
at least three ways.

We have done so in

First, for those who reported their

expected earnings, we have calculated the group likely to feel
burdened by reference to the percentage of their gross earnings
going toward their loan payments, rather than in terms of their
probable disposable income after making loan payments.

For

example, we are counting as burdened thirty-one persons who
reported that they will have gross earnings of $40,000 or more
(roughly 5 percent of the group earning at least $40,000) on the
ground that they had large loans and will be paying more than 10
percent of the gross income toward their loans, above the line
suggested by the Law School Admission Council.

If the studies of

others are a guide, members of this group are likely to feel that
their loan payments cut deeply into their disposable income.

And

yet, even after making large loan payments and paying all taxes,
almost all of this group earning $40,000 or more will have
disposable incomes of more than $20,000,68 and will be able to
live quite comfortably, at least in the view of most Americans.
A second way in which the figures for burden are likely to
be overstated is that our calculations of burden are based solely
68 This group earning over $40,000 whom we have overcounted
is probably roughly equal in size to the undercount described
above caused by excluding persons earning $25,000 to $30,000,
whose debts will feel substantial to them but whose payments will
represent slightly less than 10 percent of their gross earnings.
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on the earnings of the respondent and do not count the earnings
of any spouse or unmarried life partner of the respondent.
(Hereafter we will call such a person a "partner.")

At seven of

the nine schools we surveyed, we learned whether the respondent
had a partner and, if so, the respondent's estimate of the
earnings the partner would have during the coming year.
Roughly 40 percent of the persons in our sample had a
partner, although not all of the partners were employed.

(Some

partners were students; others were the fulltime caretakers of
children.) The average earnings of those partners who were
employed, however, were high--around $34,700.69

In fact, eleven

of our respondents had partners who expected to earn $100,000 or
more during the coming year.

A person with a high-earning

partner with whom they shared income can afford, of course, to
expend much more than 10 percent of his or her own earnings on
loan payments and still live extremely comfortably.
If we take partners and the earnings of partners into
account, how many of our respondents would still be in one of the
high-burden groups?

At the 7 schools for which we had partner

information, there were 131 persons who fit into one of our three
high-burden groups.

Of these 131, 28 had partners whom they

expected to earn $15000 or more in the coming year.

Thus, at

69 Not surprisingly, women tended to have higher earning
partners than men. Among men, 24 percent had partners whom they
expected to have no earnings next year and, of those with working
partners, the average partner was expected to earn $27,700. By
contrast, 11 percent of women had partners whom they expected to
have no earnings next year and, of those with working partners,
the average expected earnings was $42,400.
69

these seven schools, roughly 21 percent of our high burden
group, as calculated on the basis of their individual earnings,
should probably not be seen as burdened at all.70

(On the other

hand, about 10 percent of the respondents whom we placed in the
high burden group on the basis of their individual income should
probably be treated as doubly burdened for they had partners whom
they expected either to be unemployed or employed at low earnings
during the coming year.)
In future studies of debt burdens, more attention needs to
be given to partners, the partners' own educational debts, and
partners' earnings.

We lacked information from two of the

schools we studied; we did not learn about the partners'
educational debts; and we did not learn whether partners had
prospects, like most of the lawyers, of higher and higher
earnings over time. Moreover, of course, no question we could
plausibly have asked on our brief questionnaire would have
revealed the stability of the relationship between of the
respondent and the partner and thus the degree to which the
respondent could depend on the partner's contributions over the
term of the repayment.
The third way in which we have overstated the debt burden is
by our emphasis on the first year after law school.

Even if our

forecast of that first year proved fully accurate, that year, for
70 Interestingly, somewhat fewer of those whom we calculate
to have high burdens on the basis of their individual incomes had
partners than did those who do not bear high burdens (suggesting
in itself that few persons are building up large debts in the
expectation that a well-off partner will help make the payments) .
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most of the respondents, will be the lowest-earning year in their
career.

In later years, as their incomes rise, their debt

payments (except for those who choose a scheme of graduated
payments) will remain constant and constitute a smaller and
smaller proportion of their income.

As time goes by, many who

are now single will marry or form longterm relationships with
other working professionals and their debt payments will decline
even further in relation to their family income.
So why worry?

The worry, to the extent that there is one,

is that not everyone will share in the prosperity.

Some within

our survey are not sharing in it at the point of graduation and
some will not come to share in it at all.

We began this summary

section by pointing to the 16 percent of our respondents who seem
likely to feel burdened in their first year after law school.

If

we look more closely at this burdened group, we will see that it
is overrepresented with persons who may also have the least
promising prospects for high earnings in the future.

Consider

in Table XV, which reports on groups that include few persons
likely to feel burdened and groups that include a higher
proportion likely to feel burdened.
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Table XV
High and Low Debt Burden* Groups
Nine Law Schools, Graduating Class 1989

N=

Proportion of group
likely to feel some
burden in making debt
payments*

Groups with few high-burden students
Students who said they were
in top quartile of their
class

315

7%

Students expecting jobs
in large firms (50150 attorneys)

235

10%

Students expecting jobs
in very large firms
(more than 150 attorneys)

255

6%

Groups with Many High-Burden Students
Students who said they were
in bottom quartile of
their class**

172

28%

African-American and Hispanic
students

129

24%

Persons expecting jobs in
government (not counting
judicial clerkships)

127

30%

Persons expecting jobs in
legal services or other
"public interest" work

51

50%

125

24%

Persons expecting jobs in
small firms (1 to 10 attys)

* For purposes of this Table, students were considered likely to
experience burden only if they fit into one of the three
following categories: (1) They had jobs next year in positions
other than as judicial clerks and their debt payments, assuming a
consolidated 20-year payment plan, were, by our calculations,
likely to exceed 10 percent of their estimated gross incomes (see
note 62); or (2) they were working next year as judicial clerks,
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had debts of $30,000 or more, and said that they planned to work,
after their clerkship, in a small firm, in government or in legal
services; or (3) they had no job at the end of law school, had
debts of $30,000 or more, and either reported no expected setting
of work or reported expecting to work in a small firm, in
government or in legal services.

** Quartiles were self-reported at several schools. As can be
seen from this table, many more respondents placed themselves in
the first quartile than in the last.
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As Table XV reveals, persons with low grades in law school
and persons who were African-American or Hispanic were
substantially more likely than their non-Hispanic white
classmates to be in one of the high-burden groups.71

They were

more likely than others to have no job by the end of law school
or to have a job (or expect a job) in one of the lower paying
settings.

At the Group B schools in our survey, they also, on

average, had accumulated higher debts than their classmates.72
Our worry, of course, is that their economic problems will not be
transitory--that they will endure for the particular students we
have been studying and persist for future similar graduates of
the same schools.
The same concerns can be voiced for those students, minority
and other, entering government, legal services and small firms.
As Table

XV

displays, a high proportion of the students entering

or expecting to enter these settings will probably feel somewhat
burdened by their debts in their first year after law school. In
fact, based on the figures they gave us about their expected
first-year earnings, 25 percent of those entering government or
7 1 In a regression in which being in one of the high burden
groups or not was a binary dependent variable and racejethnic
group and law school grade quartile were controls, law school
quartile is strongly related to being in a high burden group,
and race, after controls, bears little relation. The relationship
between being in one of the three burden groups and being black,
hispanic or native american is still positive, but most of the
significance is accounted for by grades.
72 Among students with debts at the Group B schools,
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans had an average
debt of $39,200, while non-Hispanic whites had an average debt of
$34,500.
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legal services (excluding the judicial clerks) and 17 percent of
those entering small firms will probably have disposable incomes
of less than $15,000, after paying taxes and loan installments.
The problem for many of the persons entering these settings is
likely to persist beyond the first year.

Within our own sample,

starting salaries in government, legal services and other public
interest work were, on average, less than half the starting
salaries at the very large firms.73

Moreover, annual pay

increases of eight percent or more have been common in the very
large firms, but not, by any means, in government, legal services
and other public interest work.

In these latter settings,

workers have been fortunate if their annual raises keep pace with
increases in the costs of living.
Some confirmation of the difficulties facing those with low
grades and those in certain job settings comes from a survey
conducted by mail in January 1990 of the 1987 graduates of one of
the Group B schools in our survey. The survey primarily concerned
the jobs the respondents had taken, but, near the end,
respondents were asked for their total educational debts on
graduation and, on a 7-point scale, the difficulty they had
encountered in the two and one-half years since graduation in
paying off their loans. Category 1 on the scale was labeled "no
difficulty at all" and category 7 was labelled "a great deal of
difficulty." Of those with debts, over a quarter put themselves
in category 1, no difficulty at all, but 33 percent placed
73 See supra, n. 6 .
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themselves in categories 4 through 7. Most likely to report
difficulty, not surprisingly, were those with the highest debts,
but even after taking the size of debts into account, those with
the lowest grades in law school and those who had taken jobs
after law school in government (not including judicial
clerkships) or in legal services were significantly more likely
than others to say that they had encountered difficulties.74
A final way in which the burdens of debt are unevenly
distributed is that some schools have many more graduates likely
to feel pinched than other schools.

At one of our Group A

schools, only 5 percent of the students fit within one of the
three burdened groups.

This was the school with the lowest

tuition among our nine schools and the school whose graduates
reported the lowest average debt burdens.

By contrast, at one of

the Group B schools, 26 percent of the students seem likely to be
burdened.

This school had a high tuition and, among the Group B

schools, the lowest proportion of graduates entering large firms.
We warned at the beginning that we did not have a representative
sample of law schools within our study.

Our findings about the

uneven distribution of burdened students among schools gives a
7 4 About 70 percent of the class responded to the survey.
Among those with debts, 69 percent of those in the bottom
quartile of the class by grades and 43 percent of the third
quartile in the class put themselves into categories 4 through 7,
in comparison with 17 percent of those in the top quartile of the
class. Similarly, fifty-six percent of those whose first job
after law school (after any judicial clerkship) was in
government, legal services or public interest work put themselves
into categories 4 through 7 in comparison to only 19 percent of
those whose first postclerkship job had been in a firm of more
than 50 lawyers.
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basis for especial concern for the graduates of schools with
comparatively high tuitions that send comparatively few graduates
into jobs in the highest-paying settings.

V. Conclusions and Suggestions
We in law teaching have much for which to be grateful.
Despite the large sums that students are borrowing, the great
majority of the graduates of the nine schools we studied--and
probably the great majority of law school graduates in general-were, as of 1989, obtaining jobs that would permit them to pay
their educational loans without serious discomfort.
We nonetheless have two causes for concern. The first is
that a significant minority of the graduates seem likely to feel
quite pinched in making their loan payments in their first years
after law school. The pinched group is likely to include
disproportionate numbers of the African-American and Hispanic
graduates and disproportionate numbers of the graduates of some
schools. The second is that there is now some evidence, thin but
measurable, of a relationship between job choices and size of
debts and thus evidence that the prospects of high loan payments
may be driving some students away from jobs in government, legal
services and public interest work.
The prospects for the next several years are not
particularly encouraging. During 1990 and 1991, many private
firms and government agencies hired fewer beginning lawyers than
they had in the recent past. Entry salaries in many settings
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either were frozen at the level of the year before or rose at a
slower pace than they had over the preceding several years.

At

the same time, at most schools, the amounts of money students
were borrowing apparently continued to rise.

Harder times may

well lie ahead.
What can law schools do about the burdens of debts and the
possible effects of debts in job choice?
much.

In some senses, not

Law schools have no control over the·demand for new

lawyers or over the salaries employers will pay.

They do control

tuition increases but have limited control over most of the
operating costs that lead them to increase their tuitions.
What law schools can do is quite modest.

One small,

constructive step is for schools to learn more about their own
graduates. The study being launched by the LSAC to examine the
bar passage of minority and white law students will provide, as a
valuable by-product, an opportunity to learn more about the size
and effects of students' debts. In the meantime, individual
schools can easily replicate what we have done here. They can
match up their students' reports of their first jobs with
information about the students' grades and loans and learn
whether, among their own school's graduates, a relationship
appears between debts and job choices.

They can also use the

approaches discussed here to learn whether large numbers of their
graduates will be facing worrisome debt burdens in relation to
their probable incomes.
A second step is for law schools to strive to be as
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informative as possible to their students about the burdens they
are likely to face from their loan payments. Most schools,
perhaps all, try to help students calculate what their debt
payments will be in relation to their income. Students with
substantial debts who have hoped to enter government or legal
services or very small firms often worry throughout law school
about comfortably making ends meet after they graduate. Our study
suggests that their concern is justified, but that the concern
should not be exaggerated. A challenge for law schools will be to
provide these students candid information about their probable
debt burdens and about ways to ameliorate those burdens that do
not unduly discourage the students from holding onto their
aspirations.
A more delicate challenge is posed in providing advice to
students with low grades, for these students may have arrived at
law school with aspirations for high-paying jobs and have already
borrowed, by the end of their first year, on the basis of their
aspirations.75 At schools at which there is a strong relationship
between grades and higher-earning job opportunities--a
relationship we found at all of our lower-tuition, Group A
schools and at many of our Group B schools--financial aid
advisors need to warn students with low grades (perhaps at the
beginning of their second year) about the probability that they
will have even more burdensome debt payments than their
classmates with higher grades in relation to their incomes.
75 See discussion, supra, at pages 51-53.
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Even more delicate is the task of providing counselling to.
minority students. If a particular law school knows, from past
experience, that its minority students have, in general, attained
substantially lower law school grades than other students and
that students with lower grades have difficulties in finding
high-paying employment, it then has a fairly solid basis for
predicting, from the outset of law school, that minority students
who borrow heavily are likely to have especial financial
difficulties in paying off their loans.

No law school will feel

comfortable in advising its entering minority students that they
are likely to have narrower career choices than their majority
classmates.

To do so risks undermining the self-confidence of

students already likely to feel uncertain.

If schools are

unwilling (for understandable reasons) to be candid with
entering minority students about the risks of financial
difficulties, then they need to work especially hard to provide
scholarships or grants to minority students to reduce the amounts
of debt with which they graduate.
Some schools have responded to the problem of declining
numbers of graduates entering public service or public interest
work by creating programs that permit students to defer payments
on their loans or that provide direct support from the law school
for paying off the loans.76
"loan forgiveness" programs.

These programs are often known as
This study's finding of a

76 See D. Vernon, Education Debt Burden: Law School
Assistance Programs--A Review of Existing Programs and a
Proposed New Approach, 39 J. of Legal Ed. 743 (1989).
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relationship between job choices and debts may suggest that loan
forgiveness programs are a useful way to reduce the impact of
debts on job selection.
We need, however, to be careful not to overstate the
conclusions of this study. The evidence is not yet strong enough
to be certain that reducing the dread of large loan payments will
cause many students to decide to take a public service job. Even
if further research demonstrates more conclusively that debts are
detering some students from public service, it remains likely
that a high proportion of the students who apply for a school's
loan forgiveness program will be students who would have taken
public service jobs even if the forgiveness program hadn't
existed. Thus, if a law school decides to adopt a loan
forgiveness program, it should do so only in small part in the
hope of inducing many students to hold onto a plan of public
service they would otherwise feel forced to abandon and in larger
part on other defensible grounds for adopting such programs--for
example, that they will deliver a valuable general message about
the worthiness of public service work or that they will help
relieve the burden of loan payments for those who take public
service jobs.
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APPENDIX TABLE A1+
Factors That Relate to Students' Expectations to Enter Jobs in
Government, Legal Services or Public Interest Work or That Relate to
Expectations to Enter Jobs in Mid-Sized or Large Firms
(All Nine Schools]
All students:
who expects
lowerpaying job*
(n=1097)

Debtors only:
who expects
lowerpaying job*
(n=87)

All students
who expects
higherpaying job**
(n=1097)

Debtors only:
who expects
lowerpaying job**
n=877

Debt/$10000
B

T-ratio
probability<

-.011
1. 61
.11

-.028
3.23
.002

+.016
2.30
.03

+.031
3.50
.001

+.09
7.65
.001

+.10
7.52
.001

-.12
9.63
.001

-.13
9.49
.001

-.031
6.05
.001

-.032
5. 36
.001

+.057
10.2
.001

+.060
9.82
.001

+.005
3.08
.01

+.004
2.36
.02

-.003
1. 82
.07

Grade Quartile***
B

T-ratio
probability<

# of Interviewing
Employers/100
B

T-ratio
probability<
Salaries in Govt.,
v.small firm as %
of Larger Firm
(X100)
B

T-ratio
probability<

Adjusted r2= 14.6%

16.2%

23.7%

-.002
1. 07

.28
27.0%

* The lower-paying settings were government, legal services and firms with
five or fewer lawyers.
** The higher-paying settings were firms of 20 or more lawyers.
*** Students in the first quartile have the highest grades. Thus, the
higher the number of a student's quartile the lower the student's grades.

+ See discussion at pages 20-32.
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Appendix Table A2+
Factors That Relate to students' Expectations to Enter Jobs in
Government, Legal Services or Public Interest Work or That Relate to
Expectations to Enter Jobs in Mid-Sized or Large Firms
1

Group A Schools
Only

All students:
who expects
lowerpaying job*
(n=251)

Debtors only:
who expects
lowerpaying job*
(n=195)

All students
who expects
higherpaying job**
(n=251)

Debtors only:
who expects
lowerpaying job**
(n=l95)

Qebt/$10000
+.019
.84
.40

-.022
.71
.49

+.010
.568
.58

+.067
2.78
.01

+.16
5.41
.001

+.16
4.76
.001

-.17
7.59
.001

-.16
6.34
.001

-.746
3.45
.001

-.760
3.16
.002

+.721
4.19
.001

+.666
3.59
.001

+.003
1.06
.29

+.005
1. 65
.10

-.004
1. 98
.05

-.007
2.79
. 01

Adjusted r2= 14.3%

14.4%

B

T-ratio
probability<
Grade Quartile***
B

T-ratio
probability<

# of Interviewing
Employers/100
B

T-ratio
probability<
Salaries in Govt.,
V.Small firm as %
of Larger Firm
(x100 l
B

T-ratio
probability<

23.8%

24.8%

* The lower-paying settings were government, legal services and firms with
five or fewer lawyers.
** The higher-paying settings were firms of 20 or more lawyers.
*** Students in the first quartile have the highest grades. Thus, the
higher the number of a student's quartile the lower the student's grades.

+ See discussion at pages 20-32.
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APPENDIX TABLE A3+
Factors That Relate to Students' Expectations to Enter Jobs in
Government, Legal Services or Public Interest Work or That Relate to
Expectations to Enter Jobs in Mid-Sized or Large Firms
Group B Schools
Only
All students:
who expects
lowerpaying job*
(n=846)

Debtors only:
who expects
lowerpaying job*
(n=682)

All students
who expects
higherpaying job**
(n=846)

Debtors only:
who expects
lowerpaying job**
(n=682)

Debt/$10000
B

T-ratio
probability<

-.008
1. 27
.20

-.017
2.04
.04

+.012
1. 59
.10

+.021
1.99
.05

+.07
5.36
.001

+.08
5.67
.001

-.10
6.93
.001

-.020
2.90
.01

-.015
1. 96
.05

+.047
5.88
.001

+.048
5.14
.001

+.001
0.29
.78

+.003
.693
.50

-.002
.382
.70

-.006
1. 34
.18

5.0%

5.9%

Grade Quartile***
B

T-ratio
probability<

-.12
6.97
.001

# of Interviewing
Employers/100
B

T-ratio
probability<
Salaries in Govt.,
V.Small firm as %
of Larger Firm
(XlOO)
B

T-ratio
probability<
Adjusted r2=

12.5%

15.4%

* The lower-paying settings were government, legal services and firms with
five or fewer lawyers.
** The higher-paying settings were firms of 20 or more lawyers.
*** Students in the first quartile have the highest grades. Thus, the
higher the number of a student's quartile the lower the student's grades.

+ See discussion at pages 20-32.
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APPENDIX
Questionnaire Distributed to Graduating Classes
at 9 Schools, April 1989
SURVEY OF GRADUATING CLASS

1.

Do you have a job arranged for next year? ____Yes

____No

2. Whatever your answer to question 1, in what sort of setting will you
be working (or think it is most likely that you will be working} next
year?
a.
judicial clerkship.
b.
solo practice.
c. :::: practicing law in a firm that has approximately
other lawyers. (Fill in approximate number.)
d.
practicing law in a government agency or prosecutor's
office.
e.
practicing law in a legal services, public defender or
other nonprofit "public interest" organization.
f.
practicing law in a business or financial corporation.
g.
practicing law in some other setting ~~~--------~
h.
not practicing law, working (or studying) in some other
setting=----------------------------------------------3. If you have a judicial clerkship, what sort of setting do you expect
to work in after completing the clerkship? (Use letter from question 2,
above. If a private firm, indicate approximate expected
size.) ______________________
4. If you know, what will be your approximate salary next
year? _____________
5. Do you have a spouse/living partner?
If yes, what would you
estimate will be his/her approximate earnings next year? ______________
6. Approximately how much contractually enforceable debt do you now have,
in total, from tuition and living expenses of college, law school and
other graduate studies? _________________________
7. What is your approximate cumulative grade point average in law
school? (~., 2.7, 3.2)
8.

What is your gender? ____ female

9.

What is your racejethnic group?
Asian/Oriental
Black/African-American
HispanicjLatino

male

Native American
===: White/Caucasian
Other:

[Please fold sheet.
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Do not sign it.]

